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2I. Introduction
In this work we shall critically discuss a selected body of (mainly experimental) studies on
consumer behavior, in the light of two general questions. First, can one identify within the vast
literature from psychology, marketing, etc., a few stylized facts which might be the grounds of a
behavioral theory of consumption parsimonious enough to be useful to economic theorizing, and, at
the same time, not in open violation of the evidence on how consumers actually behave? Second, to
what extent should such theories be nested into an explicit account of the cognitive processes
leading to particular consumption acts?
The tension between normative and descriptive theories of decision making has been a constant
object of debate in the social sciences.
While the former have been developed through formal analysis and describe the decisions of
hypothetical, fully rational individuals, the latter have derived mainly from psychological research
and are aimed at pointing out the behavioral patterns and cognitive mechanisms that constitute
actual decisions by real individuals.
Notwithstanding the clear theoretical distinction between the two, the widespread practice in the
economics discipline has been to make an extensive use of the normative theory for descriptive
purposes as well (see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, (1986), and Thaler, (1987), for discussions).
However, by now an immense body of evidence demonstrates that several axioms of the normative
theories are empirically falsified. The fact that such deviations are largely systematic and have their
origin not in random errors -  which would cancel out in the aggregate - but in well identified
psychological mechanisms has then posed the problem at least to some economists of how to
modify standard theories of decision making in a way that can prove both more realistic and
(possibly) formally tractable.
Along these lines, an area of investigation entails precisely turning to psychology with the explicit
purpose of trying to identify a set of regularities about human cognition, which may constitute the
building blocks for better descriptive models of consumption, saving, investment, strategic
interaction, etc.
Several "stylized facts" (some of which will be discussed in the following) about deviations from
normative standards have been solidly assessed: for example, roughly summarizing only the most
relevant ones, individuals do not exhibit a choice pattern consistent with utility theory; they are not
3sensitive to absolute levels of outcomes but to changes in outcomes relative to a reference point;
they evaluate gains and losses asymmetrically; they significantly depart from pure self-interest; they
show time-inconsistent preferences and they do not update probabilities according to Bayes’s rule,
relying instead on intuitive heuristics such as "representativeness" and the like.
Evidence on such facts is by now so ample and robust to seriously question the descriptive validity
of most canonic economic theorizing, largely based on the familiar hypotheses of perfect rationality,
self-interest, Bayesian updating, and so forth.
Given all that, however, the fundamental theoretical issue concerns what to do about it. And the
answers widely vary. At one extreme, the "business-as-usual" approach has still a lot of appeal in
the economists profession: that is, neglect the micro evidence and treat the standard axiomatics of
consumer choice as an unrefutable generator of restrictions on some purported utility maximizing
behavior to be econometrically tested on cross-sectional or time-series data, irrespectively of their
behavioral and cognitive plausibility. This is not the place to discuss the epistemological soundness
of such an approach dating back at least to Milton Friedman (1953). Here, suffice to telegraphically
recall that, first, data which appear to conform to canonic decision-theoretic rationalizations might
indeed be the outcome of quite different data-generating processes (see, e.g. Aversi et al, (1999),
this volume). Second, notwithstanding the weak discriminatory power of such restriction-testing
exercises, a surprisingly large set of falsifying evidence is appearing concerning, primarily but not
exclusively, intertemporal choice and risk evaluation (cf. Thaler, (1994), and Browning and Lusardi,
(1996)).
The thrust of this work is, needless to say, that any descriptive theory has got to take the behavioral
and psychological evidence seriously. But the challenge is certainly hard.
As Richard Thaler puts it,
"The primary lesson here is admittedly a depressing one for economic theorists. The lesson is that their job is much
harder than we may have previously thought. Writing down a model of rational behavior and turning the crank may not
be enough, and writing down a good model of less than fully rational behavior is difficult for two reasons. First, it is not
generally possible to build good descriptive models without collecting data, and many theorists claim to have a strong
allergic reaction to data. Second, rational models tend to be simple and elegant with precise predictions, while
behavioral models tend to be complicated, and messy, with much vaguer predictions. But, look at it this way. Would you
rather be elegant and precisely wrong, or messy and vaguely right?" (Thaler, (1994), p. 198).
4One of the purposes of this work is indeed an assessment of different attempts of being at least
"vaguely right" on the grounds of the available evidence.
In section (ii) we shall provide a preliminary overview of the tangled relationships between the
psychology of choice and economic modeling. Section (iii) discusses some of the evidence on
systematic departures of actual consumption behaviors from the prescriptions of normative theories.
Section (iv) introduces some interpretative frameworks aimed at explaining that evidence. A crucial
dimension on which alternative descriptive models differ is the importance attributed to explicit
cognitive mechanisms as determinants of consumption acts. They will be discussed in section (v).
Section (vi) includes some concluding remarks and suggestions for new research directions. Finally,
section (vii) includes a brief list of the stylized facts discussed in the text with a guide to references.
Few warnings are appropriate. The discussion which follows has no ambition to thoroughly review
the immense empirical literature on consumption behavior1, and even less so the relationship
between psychology and economics (on the latter, cf. the excellent surveys by Camerer, (1995), and
Rabin, (1998)).
In particular, we neglect all factors related to the social shaping of preferences, limiting our review
solely to the cognitive aspects of the individual consumer seen as a decision maker, and, even
within these limits we are forced to leave out important topics such as learning and memory. A
critical survey of consumer choice processes with several overlappings with the present one is
Bettman, Luce and Payne (forthcoming)2. There the evidence is discussed from the point of view of
a constructive theory of consumption. While holding lot of sympathy for that approach ourselves,
we take a theoretically more agnostic stance, and start from the sheer identification of regularities
and "stylized facts" in consumption entailing departures from the normative ("rational") choice
models. Only in the second part of this work we shall discuss different theories which try to
accomodate such an evidence, with an eye also for the possibility of deriving sorts of "reduced
forms" which might be useful as alternative microfoundations of consumption in economic
theorizing (cfr. also the companion paper Aversi et al., (1999), in this volume). Another survey that
explores recent contributions on decision making on the basis of alternative views on rationality is
Mellers et al., (1998). There one can find a discussion of the evidence interpreted from the two
perspectives of "preference-based decisions" and "rule-following". While the survey does not
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 The reader interested in a more extensive review of recent empirical literature on consumer behavior should
refer to Jacoby et al., (1998).
2
 See also the preceding review in Payne et al., (1992)
5include studies on knowledge representation, which is the topic discussed in section (v), it does
contain references on judgment, risk attitudes and emotion-based choice, which are left out of the
present work.
A final warning is necessary: our description of both experimental evidence and theories is
necessarily concise and therefore largely incomplete, as we aim at highlighting the general points
which emerge from the issues discussed, but we are forced to do so at the expense of exaustiveness
and detailed formalization. The reader should therefore refer to the works cited for more extensive
expositions.
II. The Psychology and Economics of Consumer Behavior: A Preliminary Overview
The relationship between economics and psychology, especially regarding consumer behavior, has a
long history, with economic theory switching back and forth from a psychological foundation of its
models. The issue is closely related to the behavioral validity and descriptive power of economic
theories of consumption (for a discussion of the historical background, see Lewin, (1996)).
Making a long story very short, the controversy goes back at least to the debates over the notion of
utility, originally entrenched with strong psychological connotations, primarily identified, following
Bentham, with utterances of SOHDVXUH and SDLQ.
However, most of the subsequent history may be read as an effort to render economics increasingly
"psychology-free", and therefore increasingly based on purely deductive foundations. In this vein,
the notion of "utility" has gradually become a sort of meta-theoretical point of reference - a handy
shorthand to express the deductive derivation of behavior from the coherent pursuit of some
(unknown) goal by economic agents.
The axiomatization of micro behavior-  nowadays familiar also in most textbooks - builds upon the
theory of revealed preferences, which finally permitted to abandon the very notion of utility (still
carrying its somewhat ambiguous "psychological" meaning) and to rely exclusively upon purported
regularities in observed behavior, in light of the principle by which individuals want what they
choose and choose what they want - thus "revealing" their preferences3 (Lewin, 1996). In so far as
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 Note, however, that well defined preference relations can always be interpreted as the outcome of the
maximization of an underlying utility function. See Samuelson, (1938), and Varian, (1982).
6the goals - whatever they are - are coherently pursued, one should find the observational
equivalence between descriptive and normative theories of decision making.
But here come the problems stemming from the experimental evidence which has provided rigorous
tests of the foundations of the theory, proving indeed that most of the basic properties of preference
relations and the underlying utility theory are systematically violated by empirical subjects.
So, for example, the consumer of economic theory is based on a perfectly rational decision maker
whose well defined and stable preferences over a particular good do not depend on anything other
than the good in question. That is, neither the presence or absence of other goods in the market nor
the particular elicitation method have any influence on her preference relations. The decision maker
knows the entire set of alternatives available, assigns a defined utility value to each one and then
chooses by selecting the set of options that maximizes her overall utility.
However, the evidence on various forms of bounded rationality is ubiquitous.
In particular, the bounded nature of human rationality invalidates the rational choice model in more
than one respect:  In fact, individuals not only lack the knowledge and computational skills needed
to solve the complex optimization problems that the theory requires, limiting themselves to
applying satisficing "rules-of-thumb" rather than optimizing algorithms. They also often construct
their preferences at the moment of choice - rather than simply revealing them - through a complex
and partly circular process of interaction among goals, outcomes, framing of the situation,
contextual elements, mental representations and the particular decision rule utilized.
Any normative  (or rationality-based descriptive) model of consumer choice must include the
principle of  independence of irrelevant alternatives, which states that any two alternatives maintain
the same respective value for the decision maker independently on the set of options to which they
belong. Another, related assumption requires that preferences be transitive. Both assumptions have
been shown to be implausible at a descriptive level.
Other normative principles are even more compelling and fundamental for normative accounts of
rationality.
For example, dominance is so intuitively appealing to appear almost tautological (see Kreps,
(1990)); however, experimental studies have shown that individuals do sometimes violate it.
Another assumption which is so fundamental to be often taken for granted is invariance, according
to which preferences for a set of alternatives are invariant with respect to the particular elicitation
method utilized or to alternative (but formally equivalent) descriptions of the choice problem.
7However, hundreds of experiments on framing effects and preference reversals (cf. below) are there
to demonstrate that such an apparently obvious principle does not hold.
Finally, even the axiom of completeness appears exceedingly demanding, given that it excludes the
possibility (in reality far from uncommon) that the decision maker may be unable to make
comparisons between options.
In an extreme synthesis, the psychological evidence - part of which shall be discussed in the next
sections - seriously undermines the validity of the basic principles underlying both preference and
choice, therefore posing the question whether economic theories should indeed be axiomatics, or
whether on the contrary one should primarily use "positive" psychological accounts in order to
extract some inductive generalizations likely to generate the observed behavioral patterns. In
between stand theories which do take on board the experimental evidence on various departures
from standard axiomatic theories, but still derive predictions on behavior from some general
"anthropological" principles. Among them, possibly the most famous is Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, (1979), cf. below) - which seems to do a better job of describing choice
under uncertainty than von Neumann and Morgestern’s expected utility theory4, reflecting humans’
asymmetric attitudes towards risk and their sensitivity to changes rather than states (the latter being
the specification in the choice domain of a general principle of psychophysics). In any case,
whatever approach is chosen, taking seriously the systematic discrepancies between standard
normative theory and empirical evidence implies some return to the psychological roots of the
theory itself.
This is the case of the rediscovery - in a modified "Benthamian" fashion - of the psychological
notion of utility by Kahneman and Tversky5 , and it is even more so in the approaches which build
on explicit cognitive dynamics as drivers of consumption acts (cf. section (v), below).
But how deep should one go in terms of psychological foundations of consumption theory? Should
one be content of that sort of blackboxing of cognitive and emotional mechanisms implicit in any
utility-based formalization? Or on the contrary, should one take implicitly on board the mental
models shaping consumption patterns? In the light of this devide, in the following sections (iii), (iv)
and (v) we shall discuss in sequence:
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 In a similar spirit, in another domain, hyperbolic instead of exponential discounting of intertemporal utility seems
a good approximation of individuals’ impatience and desire for immediate gratification, apparently the main source
of time-inconsistent preferences (see, e.g., Loewenstein and Elster, (1992), and references therein).
8a) approaches that view consumer choice as part of a utility-driven theory of decision making, and
b) approaches that explore more in-depth and less observable cognitive processes whose link with
choice is more indirect and mediated.
To the former belong a good deal of the "biases and heuristics" research which we shall consider in
the next section. Conversely, the latter include studies on mental representations and categorization
processes, together with some developments of the psychology of reasoning.
Inbetween these two main classes  one should place some contributions on reason-based choice and
constructive choice processes. The former are attempts to analyze choice from the point of view of
the inner motivations that guide the decision maker and which trace some parallels between the
study of decision making and the psychology of reasoning. The latter is an attempt of an integrated
framework allowing a unified interpretation of most empirical facts about consumer choice that
research on biases and heuristics has highlighted.
III. Biases and Heuristics in Consumer Behavior
The program of research on judgment under uncertainty introduced by  Kahneman and Tversky
several years ago came to be known as heuristics and biases approach. The goal of the research was
to "understand the cognitive processes that produce both valid and invalid judgments" (Kahneman
and Tversky, (1996), p. 582). Along these lines, research on decision making, both by Kahneman
and Tversky and by other psychologists has aimed at understanding the mechanisms that produce
both valid decisions (from the point of view of the normative theory) and biased ones.
The study of the discrepancies between the two has indeed generated a well documented set of
systematic errors or biases that individual make when forming judgments about events or when
making decisions. The detection of systematic departures from normative rationality, within the
framework of most research on judgment and decision making, is the essential starting point to gain
some insight into the cognitive processes underlying both judgments and decisions (see Kahneman
and Tversky, (1982), Kahneman and Tversky, (1996), and Shafir, (1993b) for discussions).
Let us start with violations of some of the axioms of normative models, which are attributed to the
effect of context, to the use of particular decision heuristics or otherwise to a specific tendency on
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 Indeed, in some weaker sense, this is also the case of Lancaster’s idea of preferences defined over hedonic
attributes of goods (Lancaster, (1971)).
9the part of individuals to encode and evaluate outcomes  in a manner inconsistent with standard
notions of rationality.
Biases and context-dependent preferences
The idea that our choices depend on the context, although possibly obvious to common sense, is at
odds with the normative models of choice, according to which preferences are exogenous constructs
whose ordering cannot be altered by modifying contextual parameters.
Restated differently, borrowing the well know definition in March (1994), the theory of rational
choice in its purest form obeys the "logic of consequence", by which individuals attach
consequences to alternative courses of action on the basis of underlying preferences which are
assumed to be known, precisely defined, internally coherent and stable6 . This is the logic by and
large prevailing in microeconomic models. On the other hand, behavioral research on decision
making stresses the fact that an individual’s preferences are actually often the result of a (more or
less explicit) constructive process, through which decision makers try to assess "what they prefer"
by anchoring their estimation to their perceived identity, their goal hierarchy, but also to their
"framing" of the situation and various clues offered by the environment. Again, following March
(1994), we may say that real life decisions often obey the "logic of appropriateness" ("what is
appropriate to do for somebody with my identity in a situation like the one I am facing?"). In this
perspective, the importance of context - broadly defined as to include aspects that go from the
composition of the decision maker’s feasible set, to the amount and type of information available as
well as to social influences of various sorts - is crucial in shaping preferences and decision acts.
Given this inclusive definition of what context means in relation to decision making, note that the
experimental findings on consumer choice that will be discussed below are based on a much more
restrictive notion of context, essentially referring to the composition of the consumer’s choice set
and the role it plays in determining decisions that violate one or more axioms of standard rational
models (indeed "context effects")7. In choice situations, and particularly in consumer choice, in fact,
                                                     
6
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7
 We leave out any methodological remarks about the use of experiments in psychology and economics, and
related disagreements between the two disciplines about the “correct” methodology. While the issue is certainly
an important one, it would lead beyond the limits of the paper. However, see Camerer, (1995), for a thorough
review of experimental research on decision making  - both by psychologists and economists – rich of critical
methodological digressions.
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context effects can be defined as changes in the choice process or in its results as a function of the
particular composition of the choice set (Ratneshwar et al.,(1987)).
For example, one usually judges the convenience of a particular brand in the context of all other
brands available. If the composition of the other brands is modified (some new brands are added
and/or others are eliminated), the person may as well modify her evaluation of the brand in
question. Experiments demonstrate that even such "bland" contextual manipulations produce choice
behavior that poses serious problems to the validity of rational decision making theories. It is
plausible to imagine that such effects are likely to be magnified (rather than cancelled) by additional
contextual variables that these types of studies exclude from analysis.
Context effects
A basic principle of economics states that inefficient, dominated alternatives should not affect
choice.
In consumer theory the principle is specified by saying that the introduction of dominated products
in the consumer’s choice menu should not alter the preference ordering between existing products
(and should not alter their "market share" at all).
A further specification of this assumption is the so-called UHJXODULW\FRQGLWLRQ, which derives from
the principle of LQGHSHQGHQFHIURPLUUHOHYDQWDOWHUQDWLYHV. Formally, for any alternative x belonging
to the set A, where A is in turn a subset of B, the regularity condition states that the probability of
choosing x out of A FDQQRWEHVPDOOHU than the probability of choosing x out of B.
"  x ˛  A ˝  B, Pr(x;A) ‡  Pr(x;B)
In other terms, under the regularity condition, the overall attractiveness of a particular option of a
choice menu cannot be increased by increasing the number of other options available.
At a more aggregate level, the introduction of a new product competing with pre-existing products
should not produce an increase in the market share of one or more of the pre-existing products.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the regularity condition, a number of experiments have shown that
consumer violate it in a variety of settings. In particular, the violation most strongly occurs when the
option being added is dominated by one of the pre-existing alternatives.
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For example, imagine that a group of subjects has to choose between two products A and B. A has
superior quality but it’s more expensive than B. Subjects thus face a price/quality tradeoff. Fig. 1
represents A and B in a two-dimensional diagram in which a quality index is reported on the Y axis
and convenience (as it may be expressed by 1/P, where P is the price) is reported on the X axis.
Imagine that 55% of subjects actually choose A, while the remaining 45% choose B.
Now, suppose a third product C (usually named GHFR\) is added which is asymmetrically dominated
by B (C is inferior to B both in price and quality, but it still presents a tradeoff with A).
C, in other words must fall within the shaded area in fig. 1 to be dominated by B only.
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fig. 1
Various experiments (Huber et al., (1982)) have shown that in this second case no one chooses C,
which is clearly inferior, but its mere presence causes a substantial shift of preferences from A
towards B (in our example, 60% of subjects would choose B and 40% would choose A).
The attraction effect is one of the most robust biases in consumer choice. Experiments have been
replicated using different product classes, from chocolate bars to TV sets to beer. The pattern is
typically invariant: The average gain of the WDUJHW option (B in our example) in terms of preference
shares when the decoy is added revolves around 9%.
Various explanations have been advanced, some of which postulate the influence of perceptual
mechanisms (Heath and Chatterjee, (1991)), others (Tversky and Simonson, (1993)) the use of
particular decision heuristics based on pairwise comparisons among alternatives (which would favor
B), or the consideration that B is the option whose choice is most easily justifiable because of its
relative superiority (Simonson, (1989)).
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Finally, other experiments relate the emergence of the phenomenon to both perceptual and
categorization effects (Pan and Lehmann, (1993)).
Factors that were found to reduce the relevance of the attraction effect are, among others, a high
degree of familiarity with the product category, a high level of involvement in the particular choice
(which is supposed to activate more accurate decision processes), and brand-loyalty phenomena (see
Mishra et al., (1993); Kardes et al., (1989); Ratneshwar et al., (1987); Stewart, (1989)).
(For further developments of the attraction effect see also Aaker, (1991); Heath and Chatterjee,
(1991); Heath and Chatterjee, (1995)).
Dhar and Simonson (1992) have found out that the probability of an option being chosen can be
enhanced simply by making it the "focal option" of a comparison.
For example, in one of the experiments they ran, subjects were asked to imagine having to consider
the choice of an MBA program, and having applied to both Harvard Business School and Stanford
Business School. Subsequently, half the subjects were asked to rate, on a numerical scale, how more
or less attractive the Harvard option appeared to them compared to the Stanford option, and how
strongly they preferred being enrolled in an MBA program in Harvard compared to Stanford
(Harvard was thus rendered "focal" with respect to Stanford). The other half of the pool was given
the same questions, except  that Stanford instead of Harvard was the focal option. Both groups were
finally asked to imagine being offered admission to both schools and to indicate which one they
preferred. Results show that both Harvard and Stanford were chosen 20% more often on average
when they were the "focal options" compared to when the competing alternative was the focal
option. The experiments were replicated with different types of choices; the effect was greater when
subjects had to recall the relevant characteristics of alternatives from memory, compared to the
cases in which all the relevant information about the options was provided by the experimenter.
Two explanations can account for this effect according to the authors. The first one refers to the
FRQWUDVW PRGHO of similarity developed by Tversky (1977), whose basic properties have been
recently extended from the domain of similarity judgments to the domain of preference (Houston et
al., 1989). While most models used in psychology and marketing rely on a geometric definition of
similarity as relative distance between objects in the ideal space defined by attributes, the contrast
model is based on the assumption that judgments of similarity between two items are the result of a
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linear combination (or contrast) of the measures of their common and distinctive features (Tversky,
(1977); Tversky and Gati, (1978)).
One of the relevant properties of the model is its capacity to explain apparent anomalies in
judgments of similarity, among which is the fact that similarity judgments are often not
symmetrical, but rather depend on the direction of the comparison. In everyday judgments, we often
tend to make directional statements of similarity, tending to select the more salient item as the
referent of the comparison (for example, we say "the daughter resembles the mother, rather than
"the mother resembles the daughter"). More formally, the contrast model predicts that the following
two statements (Tversky and Gati, (1978)):
  1. Assess the degree to which D and Eare similar to each other.
  2. Assess the degree to whichD is similar to E.
should yield two different  answers (such prediction is in accordance with experimental results).
While the first form does not make any of the two items appear  more salient than the other, the
second form will focus the judge’s attention to the subject of the comparison, D more than to the
referent E.  As a result, the subject’s distinctive features will be more salient than the referent’s
distinctive features, causing asymmetries in evaluation8 .By extending the "direction of comparison"
effect from the domain of similarity relations to the domain of preference and choice, when the
distinctive features of an option are perceived to be positive, the option may be preferred more often
when it is the subject (or IRFXV) of the comparison that when it is the referent  (Houston et al.,
(1989)).
Another explanation involves the principle of ORVV DYHUVLRQ (cf. below),(Tversky and Kahneman,
(1991)), according to which losses loom larger than gains in choice. Both gains and losses are
computed with respect to a reference point (generally represented by the individuals’ status quo). In
this case, losses and gains will be valued taking the focal option as the reference point, thus making
losses that come from UHMHFWLQJ the focal option loom larger than corresponding gains.
As a result, the focal option will be favored (see also Johar and Creyer, (1993); Dhar and Sherman,
(1996)).
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 Note that geometric models do not account for asymmetry. Incidentally, note that similarity judgments have been
likewise shown to violate transitivity (Tversky and Gati, (1978)). The results can again be explained by the
Contrast Model.
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Simonson and Tversky (1992) propose the notion of WUDGHRIIFRQWUDVW as a possible generalization
for a variety of context effects, among which the attraction effect can be considered a particular
case.
The principle of tradeoff contrast can be intuitively grasped if one imagines it analog to a sort of
"perceptual illusion": In everyday settings, we often tend to perceive entities in the relation to the
"background" against which they appear to us. Thus, the same figure will be perceived differently
according to the "ground" against which it is positioned.
In much the same way, a product may be judged as more desirable if placed among "inferior"
products, and vice-versa.
This judgmental bias can also influence the way in which people value tradeoffs between attributes.
As an example, suppose you want to buy a new computer and you are offered the following two
options (Simonson and Tversky, (1992)):
-computer X, priced at $1,200, with 960K memory
-computer Y, priced at $1,000, with 640K memory.
Let this be the WDUJHW pair of options. X is the high price, large memory option, while Y is the less
price, smaller memory option.
You have to resolve a tradeoff, as your choice depends on your willingness to pay $200 more to get
320K of additional memory: restated differently, the "cost" for you of obtaining 1K additional
memory is $0.625 ($200/320K).
Simonson et al. found out that people are more inclined to choose the more expensive computer if
the choice menu includes other pairs of options for which the price/quality exchange rate is higher
than $0.625, that is pairs of options for which the "cost" of additional memory is higher than the one
implied by the WDUJHW
Similarly, if the choice menu includes pairs of options for which the cost of additional memory is
lower than the WDUJHW, people are more inclined to select the less expensive computer in the WDUJHW.
Tradeoff contrast was found to emerge in two different ways: The first one (EDFNJURXQGFRQWUDVW)
refers to alternatives encountered by consumers during past purchase experiences. The second (ORFDO
FRQWUDVW) refers to pairs of options that are included in the same choice set along with the WDUJHW
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Another principle related to the emergence of context-dependence phenomena is extremeness
aversion, which may account for the compromise effect which was found to emerge in experiments.
In many settings, individuals seem to avoid options which present extreme values, preferring
instead options that represent a compromise between two extremes.
This particular anomaly may be justified by the notion of loss aversion, which can be naturally
extended to contexts of consumption acts by picturing  the attributes of each good as advantages and
disadvantages relative to all other goods in the choice set (note that in this case the reference point
against which gains and losses are valued is not the status quo, but each of the two options in turn).
By extending the notion of loss aversion to a context of choice between alternatives,  it is possible
to hypothesize that individuals tend to weigh disadvantages more heavily than corresponding
advantages when evaluating different options.
Consider the three options represented in fig. 2:
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fig. 2
Option Y has middle values with respect to X and Z along both dimensions.
In fact, X1<Y1<Z1, and X2>Y2>Z2.
The two "extreme" options X and Z present large advantages and disadvantages relative to one
another, and smaller advantages and disadvantages relative to Y.
Y, on the other hand, presents small advantages and disadvantages relative to both.
Under the hypothesis of loss aversion, individuals select the option that minimizes the overall
disadvantages (losses), and this leads to the choice of Y.
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Therefore, Y will benefit from the presence of both X and Z in the choice menu relative to binary
choices between Y and Z, or Y and X alone.
From a decision-theoretic point of view, this result is another violation of the regularity condition,
although no dominated option is added, since the middle option is supposed to "score" better when a
third option is introduced.
Simonson and Tversky introduce the two terms of FRPSURPLVH and SRODUL]DWLRQ to distinguish
between the case in which extremeness aversion applies to both attributes from the one in which it
applies to one attribute only.
That is, a FRPSURPLVHHIIHFW occurs when adding Z to the (X,Y) pair favors Y over X  DQG adding X
to the (Y,Z) pair favors Y over Z (see also Wernerfelt, (1995)).
In the case of SRODUL]DWLRQ, only one of the two outcomes occurs.
The experimental evidence above described (see also Simonson, (1993) for a review) suggest the
fact that the process of evaluation of alternatives  is comparative in nature, that is the attractiveness
of every option closely depends, among other factors, on the options with which it is compared.
Tversky and Simonson (1993) propose a model of context-dependence choice which expresses the
choice function as a linear combination of three components: the context-independent value of an
option, the effect of the background, that is of choice sets encountered in the past, and the impact of
the current choice set. Each component is weighted according to its relative importance in
determining the overall attractiveness of an option. For values of weights = 0, the model reduces to
the standard model based on utility maximization. The authors’ model can contribute to make sense
of empirical evidence on violations of normative principles, in particular it incorporates the two
phenomena of tradeoff contrast and extremeness aversion above described.
Shafir et al. (1990a) have developed a similar model - called the Advantage Model - which takes the
"comparative" nature of choice into account helping make sense of certain experimental phenomena
like the ones described.
According to their model, the overall value attached to every option in a choice set derives from the
use of both absolute and comparative strategies of evaluation, the results of which are subsequently
combined. While the model has been originally formulated for choice involving monetary
outcomes, its results can be easily extended to nonmonetary choices as well.
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Framing
Framing effects are maybe the most radical challenge to normative models of choice, in that they
violate the axiom of description invariance9, which is normally considered so essential to be not
even explicitly mentioned among the principles of rational choice theory. In effect, framing can be
considered an extreme example of context-dependence, where preference reversal occurs by simply
modifying the description of (otherwise identical) sets of alternatives.
In what is probably their most famous experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) proposed to two
different groups of subjects a choice between two alternative programs to combat an unusual Asian
disease expected to kill 600 people in the U.S. In one version of the problem, the two programs
were described in terms of the estimated number of lives that each program could be expected to
save, while in another version the same two programs were described in terms of the number of
lives that would be lost in each case. Although the two descriptions were formally equivalent, the
shift of preference was dramatic: in the "lives saved" version, 72% of subjects preferred the less
risky program, allowing to save 200 people for sure; in the "lives lost" version, 78% preferred the
more risky program, accepting one-third of probability of letting 600 people die.
Analogous framing effects were found in the domain of riskless choice. So, for example (Levin and
Gaeth, (1988)), consumers seem to be more willing to buy a product when this is described as being
"75% lean" than when it is described as having "25% fat". The rationale for the existence of framing
effects again has to do with the fact that individuals are more sensitive to losses than to equal-sized
gains, where gains and losses are calculated with respect to a reference point (a relevant implication
for choice under uncertainty is the emergence of risk aversion in the domain of gains, and risk-
seeking behavior in the domain of losses).
So, for example, in the experiment above, individuals perceive alternatives in the "lives saved"
version as gains with respect to a reference point represented by the death of 600 people if nothing
is done. On the contrary, in the "lives lost" version, the two programs are encoded in terms of the
losses they yield with respect to a reference point represented by the current situation in which
nobody has yet died.
                                                     
9
 On violation of another fundamental axiom, procedure invariance, see, e.g., Slovic and Lichtenstein, (1969),
Tversky and Thaler, (1990).
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Reference-dependence certainly appears to many as a plausible psychological characteristic of
human judgment and perception, which, as far as the choice domain is concerned, could be in itself
accounted for by some "mild" modification of standard utility theory (A reference-dependence
model of riskless choice based on experimental evidence has been developed by Tversky and
Kahneman, (1991); see also Rabin, (1998), for a discussion). However, what experiments on
framing show is that the reference point can be very easily manipulated, with dramatic effects on
preference and choice. Moreover, individuals may set up their own reference point based on
(alternatively) their status quo, their aspiration levels, possibly somebody else’s current status, or
some weighted combination of these. In addition, the use of any one of such reference levels  may
evolve over time due to adaptation (see Tversky and Kahneman, (1991)). Such facts are particularly
disturbing for advocates of standard theory and likewise challenging for any behavioral theory of
consumption, because once reference-dependence is included in the utility function, the
specification of ZKDW reference point will be used in a particular choice situation is both difficult to
assess and essential to allow predictions on behavior.
Heuristics
Let us now consider the main decision rules that have been identified in studies on consumer
behavior. A KHXULVWLF is commonly defined as a rule or strategy of behavior to be used in solving
problems. Heuristics have different levels of complexity and accuracy depending on such factors as
the amount of information available, the level of individuals’ rationality and the level of
involvement in the particular task at hand (Hogarth, (1987)).
The main lesson from studies on heuristics is that consumer decision making strategies are
contingent on multiple variables including the complexity of the task, the amount of information
processed, the existence of time constraints, the nature of contextual components.
Several experimental studies have been conducted which aim at classifying different strategies
through measures like their degree of accuracy, the effort level they require, the amount of
information processed and how different pieces of information are put in relation to one another
(see, e.g., Payne, (1976), for a classic study; Bettman et al., (1991), Payne et al., (1992)). The
"normative" yardstick in this case is provided by decision rules which resemble the rational model,
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inasmuch as they use all the information available in a manner consistent with rationality and prove
relatively "immune" from context influences or preference elicitation methods.
With respect to contributions on biases, literature on heuristics shifts the focus of attention from the
outcomes of choice and their consistency with normative standards, to the underlying cognitive
mechanisms producing those outcomes. In this respect, studies on heuristics represent an important
step towards a more constructive view of consumer decision making, in that they open the "black
box" of the decision maker’s inferential machinery and its relations (often ambiguous and contingent
on the particular nature of the task) with preference formation and choice.
The two areas are closely related, as the use of certain decision making procedures is tightly
associated with violations of  rational choice models. However, the shift of focus from outcomes to
processes themselves implies the adoption of a partly different theoretical framework. If research on
biases demonstrates that the paradigm of full rationality must be relaxed in order to account for
some well-documented "distortions", the framework underlying choice processes starts from the
Simonian paradigm of bounded rationality and goes further in trying to identify its procedural
manifestations, instead of simply invoking it as a general justifying principle for deviations from
normative standards10.
Bettman, Johnson, and Payne (1991) trace a classification of the most common heuristics together
with an indication of the situations in which each of them is most likely to occur. The following
brief description is largely based on their work.
7KH:HLJKWHG$GGLWLYH:$''5XOHcan be considered the heuristic that consumers are supposed
to use according to normative theory of decision making.
It implies taking into account the values of each alternative on all the relevant attributes and
considering  the relative importance of each attribute to the decision maker.
According to the WADD rule, a weighted value for each attribute is obtained by multiplying the
weight times the attribute value. All attribute values are then summed up to arrive at an overall
evaluation of the alternative. The alternative that presents the highest overall evaluation is then
chosen.
                                                     
10
 This statement requires some explanation: the critique to the general lack on interest in the explicitation of the
cognitive mechanisms underlying decision making is obviously not addressed to psychologists, who – by
definition! – have always been mainly concerned with such topics; rather, it refers to other social scientists, and in
particular to economists.
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In the real world, this particular heuristic is seldom used, due to the large amount of information
processing that requires. Moreover, even though consumers are normally aware of the relative
importance of each attribute to them, nevertheless they are not always able to assign weights.
As a result, simpler heuristics are usually preferred. A simplification of the WADD rule eliminates
different weights for the attributes assuming that they all are equally important. An option is
selected by simply summing the values of the attributes for each alternative and then comparing the
results.
7KH6DWLVILFLQJ+HXULVWLF requiresa cutoff level to be set for each attribute. Alternatives are then
evaluated one at a time in the order in which they occur, and the value of each attribute is compared
to the cutoff level. If the value of any of the attributes is below the cutoff level, that alternative is
rejected. The first alternative that meets the cutoff requirements for each attribute is then chosen. If
no alternatives pass the cutoff requirements, then the cutoff levels are relaxed and the process
repeated all over again.
The alternative that will be selected depends on the level of the cutoffs and on the order in which
alternatives are considered. For instance, if option A and option B both meet all the cutoff
requirements, then the choice of either one will depend on which one is evaluated first.
7KH /H[LFRJUDSKLF +HXULVWLF requires a complete ranking of the attributes in terms of relative
importance. The consumer determines the most important attribute and then examines the values of
all alternatives on that attribute. The alternative that presents the best value on the most important
attribute is selected. If two alternatives are equal in the sense that they present equal values on that
attribute, then the second most important attribute is considered, and the procedure continues until
one option is chosen.
A widely known heuristic is the (OLPLQDWLRQE\$VSHFWV(%$The first formulation of this model
of choice is due to Tversky (1972). It is based on the idea that individuals do not choose objects SHU
VH; rather, they tend to choose the collection of features (or aspects) of which these are composed. In
its original formulation, EBA determines that at every step a particular aspect is picked randomly.
Then, all alternatives that do not have that aspect are eliminated; if only one option is left, the
process is over; otherwise, a second aspect is selected and other alternatives eliminated until there is
only one left (see also below).
7KH(OLPLQDWLRQE\&XWRIIV+HXULVWLFis procedurally very similar to the lexicographic rule, with the
difference thata cutoff level is established for each attribute and all alternatives that do not meet the
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cutoff requirement are eliminated. At every step an attribute is selected according to its relative
importance, and alternatives that do not meet the cutoff level for that attribute are eliminated. The
process continues until there is one option left.
7KH0DMRULW\RI&RQILUPLQJ'LPHQVLRQV+HXULVWLFdetermines that comparisons be made between
pairs of alternatives. The values on each attribute are compared between two alternatives. The
alternative with a higher number of winning attributes remains, while the other is rejected. The
winner is then compared with the next alternative in the set. The process of pairwise comparisons
continues until all alternatives have been evaluated and the final winning identified.
It is to be noted that the use of a similar heuristic can in part account for the attraction effect (cf.
above). Tversky and Simonson (1993) propose a tournament-like model of choice, in which each
option is compared against each other option of the choice menu in terms of its winning attributes.
When one of the options is asymmetrically dominated, it is easy to verify that the option that
dominates it is bound to be selected.
7KH)UHTXHQF\RI*RRGDQG%DG)HDWXUHVRU)UHTXHQF\.QRZOHGJHis a very simple heuristic
that implies that consumer develop certain criteria  to determine that certain features are good or
bad: Then, the consumer may simply count the number of good and bad features. The choice can
then vary according to whether the consumer prefers the option with the smallest number of bad
features or the one with the biggest number of good features (see also Alba and Marmorstein,
(1987)).
Several other types of simpler heuristics seem to be used by consumers in various types of
situations: maybe the simplest and the most common one in low involvement situations is the
habitual heuristic: "Choose what you chose last time". Another heuristic, called affect referral
(Wright and Barbour, (1975)) consists in recalling from memory  previously formed global
evaluations for familiar alternatives and choose accordingly.
Other heuristics used in low-involvement choices are (Hoyer, (1984)) strategies "price-oriented"
(buy the cheapest brand), strategies "performance-oriented" (buy the brand that seems the best),
affective strategies (buy the brand that is the most familiar to you),  "in-store" strategies (buy the
first brand that you find), and strategies that are combinations of the preceding ones.
The most usual distinction is between FRPSHQVDWRU\ and QRQFRPSHQVDWRU\ heuristics.
22
In general, a heuristic is FRPSHQVDWRU\ if good values on some attributes can compensate for poor
values on other attributes. For example, rules such as the WADD or equal weight are defined as
FRPSHQVDWRU\.
On the contrary, a rule is defined as QRQFRPSHQVDWRU\ if it does not permit such compensation.
Traditionally  QRQFRPSHQVDWRU\ heuristics are also called VHTXHQWLDO, as they typically involve a
sequential elimination of options or subsets of options: examples of this second type are the
Lexicographic rule, or the Elimination-by-Cutoffs.
&RPSHQVDWRU\ rules are normally considered more difficult and elaborate, in that they require a
greater processing effort. Therefore, especially in cases of low involvement purchases, consumers
tend to avoid using them. It is also suggested that the use of FRPSHQVDWRU\ rules implies the
evaluation of tradeoffs between values that can sometimes be emotionally difficult (Hogarth,
(1987)).
Sequential heuristics, on the other hand, are less efficient than FRPSHQVDWRU\ ones because they
allow a greater probability that a sub-optimal alternative is chosen. In fact, with EBA rule, for any
set of alternatives, a particular sequence of aspects can be specified that determines the worst option
in the set to be selected.
In a large number of concrete examples, consumers may use mixed strategies according to the phase
of the choice process. For instance, a typical choice strategy may imply an initial step in which bad
alternatives are eliminated using a very simple sequential heuristic (such as EBA, or Elimination-
by-Cutoffs). Then, the few options left may be examined more carefully through the use of a
FRPSHQVDWRU\ strategy.
Agendas
Kahn et al. (1987) report a TV commercial that says: " Only 10 airline companies offer flights from
Los Angeles to London: of these, only 5 offer non-stop flights: of these 5 companies, only 3 use
Jumbo 747: of these 3, only 2 have special plans for business class flyers: Finally, of these 2, only
one offers a flexible and reliable service: Ours".
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The commercial not only suggests customers which attribute to consider when choosing an airline
company, but also in which RUGHU to consider them. Kahn et al. report the commercial as an
example of DJHQGD (see, e.g., Tversky and Sattath, (1979), Hauser, (1986)).
An agenda can be defined as a sequence of constraints that operates to progressively restrict the set
of alternatives. It may be viewed as a generalization of the class of noncompensatory or sequential
heuristics.
Agendas can be of two types: top-down or bottom-up. The crucial variable in determining the use of
either one has been found to be the consumer’s level of familiarity with the product (Wagner and
Klein, (1993)). The following is a hypothetical low-familiarity scenario, in which  a top-down
agenda is used to make a decision:
Imagine finding yourself in New York for the first time in your life and you must choose in which
restaurant to eat: The set of alternatives available to you is close to infinite, and you have no
recollections of nice restaurants you have heard of, nor can you count on some friend’s advice. The
only tool you can use is a guide of restaurants.  Most likely you may start  by categorizing
restaurants based on the type of food they offer (Chinese, Italian, French, etc.), then select the
category that you like the most. At this point you have already reduced the set of alternatives to a
much smaller number. Then, assuming you picked Indian restaurants, the next step might be to spot
Indian restaurants that are located near your hotel in Manhattan. This second constraints further
restricts the set of your possible choices, and then you may make your final selection based on the
price range, or some other features that are relevant to you.
In the following high-familiarity scenario  a bottom-up agenda is used instead:
Imagine being in the town where you usually live and you want to go out for dinner. Since you are
already familiar with restaurants in your neighborhood, you may start thinking at what restaurant is
best in each category (Chinese, Italian, French, etc.) and then you may make pairwise comparisons
between the "winners" to arrive at your final selection.
Sometimes constraints are self-imposed, otherwise they can be imposed by the way information
about a product is provided (see Kahn et al., (1987)).
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Agendas, like other heuristics belonging to the noncompensatory class, can sometimes lead to
inefficient choices, especially in the top-down case. For any alternative, in fact, a particular
sequence of constraints can be found that will lead the decision-maker to select it. As a result,
dominated options have a positive probability of being chosen.
The following is an example from Hauser (1986) on a hypothetical choice between air travel tickets
(tested experimentally in Devetag et al., (1996)):
x. Japan via Japan Air Lines (JAL) with free drinks on the plane:
y. Japan via Northwest Orient (NW):
v. Japan via Japan Air Lines (JAL):
z. Hong-Kong via Northwest Orient (NW).
Option v is clearly dominated by option x in the whole set (x, y, v, z). But suppose that the decision-
maker is induced to partition the choice set in the two subsets (x,y) and (v,z).
Since  the second set presents more variety in terms of destination, it has a positive probability of
being chosen. If the second subset is selected, the decision-maker might choose option v, which is
not dominated by z, although it is dominated in the original set11.
Hierarchical selection and the similarity hypothesis
The view of the choice process as a sequence of constraints is at the base of a class of  models
which treat choice as a hierarchical elimination process. The elimination process is usually defined
over a tree-like representation of alternatives reflecting the structure of  their underlying similarity
relations. Similarity among alternatives has a meaningful impact on choice: the more similar two
options are to each other, the easier they are to compare, and more likely they are to be perceived as
close substitutes for one another. Similarity between options has been totally neglected by
normative models of choice. Tversky (1972), on the other hand, formulates the "similarity
                                                     
11
 For a classic study of agenda effects on voting behavior, see Levine and Plott, (1977), and Plott and Levine,
(1978)
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hypothesis", according to which " the addition of an alternative to an offered set "hurts" alternatives
that are similar to the added alternative more than those that are dissimilar to it" (Tversky, (1972), p.
283)12
Let us consider a classic example from Debreu (discussed at greater length in Tversky (1972)).
A consumer  is facing a choice between two records of classical music: The first one is a symphony
by Beethoven (option B1 in fig. 3a), the second one is a record by Debussy (option D in the same
figure).
0.6 0.4
B1 D
fig. 3a
Now imagine that a third option becomes available, consisting in a different recording of the same
symphony by Beethoven (option B2 in fig. 3b).
D
0.40.6
0.3 0.3
B1 B2
fig.3b
According to normative models, the consumer assigns a utility value to each of the two options,
and, assuming she prefers the Beethoven to the Debussy, u(B1) > u(D). When the third option is
                                                     
12
 Note that the similarity hypothesis is inconsistent with the principle of independence (cf. section iii). In fact, the
consideration of similarity relations introduces strong dependence among the elements of the choice set.
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introduced, the consumer assigns a utility value to it, which may be equal or greater than either one
in the original set, but not such as to reverse the preference ordering already established between B1
and D.
The third option, in other words, might as well have been a Bach, or a Schubert.
On the other hand, it is clear enough that the third option is far more similar to the first Beethoven
than to the Debussy. Therefore, according to the similarity hypothesis, its introduction is likely to
affect B1 negatively more than D. Let us restate this in probabilistic terms, and assume that the
probability of the consumer choosing B1 prior to the introduction of B2 is .6, with the probability of
she choosing D being thus .4 (fig. 3a):
When B2 is introduced in the choice menu (fig. 3b), the consumer who perceives similarity will
certainly consider the two Beethoven highly substitutable or even identical so that she might
become indifferent on which one to pick. If the last one is the case, then the probability of the
consumer choosing B1 will drop to .3, then reversing the previous preference ordering between B1
and D (the probability of choosing D should remain invariant).
Clearly, the high degree of similarity causes the two Beethoven to be perceived almost as a single
alternative to be compared with the Debussy.
Tversky and Sattath (1979) propose a probabilistic model called SUHIHUHQFHWUHH (or SUHWUHH), which
represents a further (and more parsimonious) specification of the Elimination-by-Aspects model,
and which is consistent with the similarity hypothesis. Each option in SUHWUHH is represented as a
measureable collection of aspects, and the entire set of aspects is assumed to have a tree structure.
At each stage an aspect - corresponding to a branch of the tree - is selected with a probability
proportional to its measure, and all alternatives not belonging to the selected branch are eliminated.
The process continues until a single option remains. The model expresses context dependence of
choice in a way that reflects how structural relations (i.e., similarity relations) among alternatives
influence the way options are clustered together in subsets and the sequence in which they are
compared. The model is important both from a decision-theoretic point of view, since it relaxes the
principle of independence, and from a psychological point of view, because it reflects a choice
procedure that is commonly utilized by individuals in several contexts (for example, if one has to
choose a post-graduation career, she might first decide between, say, finding a job or going to
graduate school; then, if she opts for graduate school, she will decide among several possible fields
and then among different schools which offer the chosen program of studies).
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The tree model has been tested empirically for several sets of  (admittedly aggregate) data, and it
appears to improve goodness-of-fit relative to models which assume independence. Furthermore, all
data sets analyzed by the authors show patterns which are consistent with the similarity hypothesis.
To conclude, research on heuristics directly addresses the issue of how human decision makers
process information, an aspect which tends to be neglected by the paradigm of "rationality with
distortions". While research on biases is typically undertaken by using very simple and stylized
choice problems for which the normative theory often provides the "correct" answer, experiments
on heuristics are conducted using more complex problems for which no clear "solution" might exist
and which might require the processing of a large amount of data. Experimental techniques are
likewise more elaborated than simply providing subjects with alternatives and asking them to
choose; rather, they often involve also the use of "thinking aloud" procedures and verbal protocol
analysis.
As a result, research on heuristics has not received much consideration from economists, since the
involved decision processes requires far more cognitive details than usually most of them are
willing to incorporate in their models. Too often, in fact, economists’ effort  to render their theories
more behaviorally based has manifested itself through various redefinitions and "refinements" of
utility functions - as seen in the previous section, especially in the direction of reflecting consumers’
hedonic experiences and their dependence on comparative evaluations.
While such theoretical developments have certainly represented an important step toward
psychologically more plausible theorizing, the procedural phase of decision making has been left
basically unmodified, and totally identified - by definition - with the coherent fulfillment of the
decision maker’s goal (which, needless to say, often consists in finding the solution to some
optimization problem). On the other hand, experimental literature on heuristics not only emphasizes
the "satisficing" rather than optimizing nature of most decision making strategies, trying to build
taxonomies according to the degrees of "boundedness" of rationality they embed; it also tries to
identify the variegated links between decision strategies and the consumer’s goals, which often
cannot be reduced to the maximization of one’s own utility (however defined).
Among the limits of research on heuristics, which can be broadly seen as deriving from the
paradigm developed by Newell and Simon (1971) for the treatment of problem solving, lies the
underlying "closed world" assumption, associated with the idea of the decision maker as an
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information processing machine (Holyoak and Spellman, (1993)). The decision maker’s goal,
whatever this may be, is precisely specified H[ DQWH, the amount of information and knowledge
needed to "solve" the choice problem may be  large but it is nonetheless delimited, and the choice
process itself is viewed as a conscious search through the space of alternatives in the direction of
goal achievement.
IV. From evidence to theories
Interpretation of the evidence on the grounds of Prospect Theory
One of the seminal behavioral contributions to the theory of consumption is in Thaler (1980). There,
one finds a discussion of a wide set of circumstances in which several assumptions of the rational
models are falsified due to less-than fully-rational behavior. Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect
Theory (1979), originally developed as a descriptive model of choice under uncertainty, is then
proposed as an alternative framework under which these various anomalies can be accounted for.
Prospect Theory introduces a YDOXH IXQFWLRQ for outcomes, which replaces the traditional utility
function used in standard theory and which incorporates the three following behavioral principles:
- Individuals encode outcomes as gains or losses relative to a natural reference point, usually given
by their current status or by an aspiration level.
- Losses are valued more heavily than corresponding gains.
- Individuals show a diminishing sensitivity to both gains and losses. That is, adding gains yields a
less than proportional marginal utility and adding losses yields a less than proportional marginal
disutility.
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The three above mentioned properties generate a function like the one depicted in fig. 4:
The authors refer to YDOXH instead of utility to differentiate its meaning from the one prevailing in
normative models: value in Prospect Theory essentially refers to a hedonic notion of utility.
While Prospect Theory’s original purpose was to describe choices among monetary lotteries, its
behavioral properties can be extended to deterministic choice as well.
Several anomalies which the standard theory of the consumer would not predict  can be explained
within the framework offered by Prospect Theory.
Consider the following example, from Thaler (1980):
Mr. R bought a case of good wine in the late 50s for about $5 a bottle. A few years later his wine
merchant offered to buy the wine back for $100 a bottle. He refused, although he has never paid
more than $35 for a bottle of wine.
Why did Mr. R refused the offer to sell his wine back? This pattern of behavior is consistent with
several experimental findings that show how individuals are reluctant to give up objects once these
have become part of their endowment. The difference between what people demand to give up a
$
V($)
Fig. 4
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good (the selling price) and what they would be willing to pay to acquire it (the buying price) is
caused by what Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) call HQGRZPHQWHIIHFW.
While standard theory predicts no discrepancy between buying and selling prices,  the notion of loss
aversion can help make sense of the phenomenon: the most direct effect of loss aversion is in fact
people’s reluctance to give up what they already have. The disutility of giving up an object that is
felt as being part of one’s HQGRZPHQWseems to be greater than the utility derived from acquiring that
same object.
A closely related effect is the so-called VWDWXVTXR bias, that is the tendency of individuals to prefer
the status quo to any change.
Curiously enough, once an object is acquired, it becomes part of the owner’s endowment almost
instantly.
Kahneman et al. (1990) ran a series of experiments in which an artificial market for coffee mugs
was reproduced in a laboratory.
In one of these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to three different roles. One group,
the Sellers, were given coffee mugs and were asked whether they were willing to sell the mugs at
each of a series of prices whose range varied from $0.25 to $9.25.  A second group, the Buyers,
were asked to state their willingness to buy the mugs for each price of the same set. The third group,
the Choosers, were simply asked to choose, for each of the stated prices, between a mug or the
amount of money in cash.
Both Choosers and Sellers have to decide, for each price, between the mug and the amount of
money in cash, so their situation is equivalent. The median reservation prices in the experiments
were $7.12 for the Sellers, $3.12 for the Choosers, and $2.87 for the Buyers. The difference
between Buyers and Choosers is negligible, showing that gaining or losing money made a
difference. Rather, whether or not subjects had been endowed with the mugs did make a difference,
since the Sellers (the mug owners) set up a much higher price (note that mugs were assigned
randomly).
Subsequent experiments show that the discrepancy between the two prices diminishes with repeated
experience and feedback, although it does not disappear (see Camerer, (1995), and references
therein).
A related assumption of economic theory is that out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs should be
equally valued.
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Out-of-pocket costs, however, are typically overweighed relative to opportunity costs.
Knowing that individuals are loss averse can provide one with some insight into this anomaly:
assuming that people consider out-of-pocket costs as losses and  opportunity costs as foregone
gains, then of course the former will loom larger than the latter.
The HQGRZPHQW HIIHFW can be considered as a particular example of such asymmetric evaluation:
giving up a good belonging to one’s endowment is perceived as an out-of-pocket cost (and therefore
overweighted), relative to the opportunity cost of acquiring the same good.
A related tenet of economic rationality states that only incremental costs and benefits should affect
choice. Sunk costs are historical costs,  and  should be irrelevant in calculations of future utility
values. However, experiments as well as daily experience give us many example in which the
principle does not hold13.
In consumer settings the VXQNFRVWHIIHFW can  lead to situations in which "paying for the right to use
a good or service will increase the rate at which the good will be utilized, FHWHULVSDULEXV (Thaler,
(1994), p. 11). For example, if the price of annual subscriptions to a swimming pool increases, then,
although the number of subscriptions may decrease, those who do subscribe may be likely to go to
the pool more often compared to previous years14.
According to Thaler, such behavioral pattern makes perfect sense under the hypothesis of loss
aversion.  However, some additional assumptions have to be made regarding the ‘hedonic’
evaluation of gains and losses. It is certainly plausible to assume that people do not generally
perceive costs (i.e. prices o goods) as losses when the purchase is for immediate consumption. In
fact, if this was not the case, under the hypothesis of loss aversion, people would hardly buy
anything. Rather, what individuals perceive is only the net gain (or SOHDVXUH, in Benthamian terms)
resulting from the transaction (if this is positive). Similarly, for goods whose consumption is
delayed with respect to the moment of purchase, the cost substained will be perceived as an
investment to be repaid when the good is consumed. Only if such consumption for some reason
does not occur will individuals perceive the cost as a loss, thus feeling SDLQ. Thaler argues that it is
in order to avoid such losses that people are sensitive to sunk costs, and behave in ways that could
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 In organizational decisions, the violation of this assumption can often lead managers to commit resources into
failing investments. For the phenomenon of “escalation to sunk costs” see Staw, (1997).
14
 See also Camerer, (1995), and Rabin, (1998), for reviews of the endowment effect and related biases and their
implications for aggregate economic behavior.
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be judged as self-damaging in some cases. He makes the example of a man who has paid a $300
annual subscription to a tennis club and develops a tennis elbow after two weeks. To avoid
recognizing the ORVV of the $300, he prefers to keep playing tennis in pain (Thaler, 1994).
According to Prospect Theory, individuals evaluate outcomes as changes from a UHIHUHQFH SRLQW
rather than absolute values. In common purchase situations, the reference point is often given by
what consumers perceive as a fair price, or market price for the good they are planning to buy.
The price that consumers perceive as IDLU for a good varies according to some contextual factors
(Thaler, (1985)). Location may be one of these. We certainly expect to be charged very different
prices for the same FDSSXFFLQR according to whether we drink it at a Starbuck’s on Main Street or at
Cafe’ Florian in Venice. In this case the extra money pays the view of St. Mark’s Square that we can
enjoy in the latter case. But even when we cannot benefit from the extra-value of location or
"atmosphere", our perception of a fair price takes these differences into account.
Consider the following scenario:
"You are lying on the beach on a very hot day. All you have to drink is ice water. For the last hour
you have been thinking how much you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favorite brand of beer.
A companion gets up to go make a phone call and offers to bring back a beer from the only nearby
place where beer is sold, a small run-down grocery store. He says that the beer might be expensive
and so he asks you how much you are willing to pay for the beer. Your friend will buy the beer only
if it is less than the price you state". (Thaler, (1985)).
The median price that subjects presented with this scenario were willing to pay was $1.50. Another
group of subjects were given an identical scenario, with "small run-down grocery store" being
replaced by a "fancy resort hotel". The median price was $2.65 in this second case (note that the
consumer of the beer in this example would not enjoy any of the comforts and amenities of the
fancy resort hotel). The difference can be explained by assuming that subjects adjusted their notion
of a fair price according to the type of seller (Thaler, (1985)).
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Related experiments further investigate the determinants of reference price formation and the role of
framing effects in consumer settings (see, e.g., Diamond and Campbell, (1989), Heath et al., (1995),
Jacobson, (1989)).
Mental Accounting
Thaler (1980) argues that many of the characteristics of deterministic choice can be better
understood if we imagine our decisions as the result of some "naive" mental accounting15.
Much similarly to real accounting systems operating in firms and households, individuals encode
outcomes of transactions according to a mental accounting system by which gains and losses are
assigned to specific accounts depending on time or contextual cues.
The rules for the creation of mental accounts are rather flexible and the same transaction can be
accounted for according to different principles. Thus, for example, most households group
expenditures into different categories (food, clothes, durables, etc.) and potential purchases are then
evaluated on the basis of the portion of income assigned to the specific category rather than on the
basis of overall earnings.
Many budgetary rules are temporally specific, being usually defined over a weekly or monthly basis
rather than, say, over one’s lifetime wealth. Sometimes mental accounts can be created  as
commitment devices to overcome self-control problems.
The existence of  mental accounting violates the economic principle of fungibility of money, and
has some important psychological and economic implications.
One implication concerns the joint or separate treatment of gains and losses.
According to Thaler (1985) we either LQWHJUDWH or VHJUHJDWH gains and losses associated with an
item, before assigning a value to it. Whether the computation of gains and losses results from
integration or segregation will influence our overall evaluation of the item in question.
While a general rule cannot be established,  in principle individuals will tend to compute outcomes
so as to maximize the utility they derive from a  transaction.
We know from Prospect Theory that adding gains yields a decreasing marginal utility and likewise
adding losses yields a decreasing marginal disutility.
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 See also, e.g., Heath and Sall, (1996), and Bonini and Rumiati, (1996).
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Consequently, losses will be generally integrated, so as to minimize their negative impact while
gains will be segregated whenever possible, that is whenever the situation justifies the creation of
separate mental accounts.
Thus, the price of a kitchen set we decide to buy for our brand new house will be probably
integrated with the total price of the house so that the disutility from the loss will be less than if we
encoded it separately (but if we buy the kitchen set a long time DIWHU purchasing the house, the
integration will no longer be justified). On the other hand, winning $100 and $200 in two different
occasions (for example, racetracks and a poker game) rather than winning $300 in a single trial will
justify a separate evaluation of the two gains, thus making us happier. Clearly, the segregation or
integration in these examples suggests the existence of different mental accounting systems which
we create and maintain much to our advantage; a single comprehensive account for "house
expenditures" in the former case, and two separate accounts, one for racetrack and one for poker in
the latter.
The existence of  "topic" mental accounts combined with diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses
can be illustrated by the following experiment:
Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $125, and a calculator for $15. The calculator
salesman informs you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $10 at the other branch of the
store, located 20 minutes’ drive away. Would you make the trip to the other store? (Tversky and
Kahneman, (1981)).
Most subject answered they would; however, very few subjects said they would in another version
of the experiment in which the $5 savings was relative to the jacket and not to the calculator.
In this case, VHJUHJDWLRQ of mental accounting for the two items makes the same $5 saving more
appealing in the case in which it applies to a smaller loss: again, the particular shape of the value
function can help make sense of this anomaly (see also Thaler, forthcoming).
Thaler (1985)  proposes a behavioral model of consumer choice based on the empirical evidence so
far described.
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Its model replaces the traditional utility function with the value function from Prospect Theory. In
addition, it introduces a notion of  reference price and the new related concepts of DFTXLVLWLRQXWLOLW\
and WUDQVDFWLRQXWLOLW\.
While the former depends merely on the value of an item in relation to its cost,  thus being
essentially equivalent to the standard concept of utility, the latter depends only on the perceived
value of the transaction, which is judged by comparing the price of the item to some reference price.
Finally, the principle of fungibility is relaxed in order to reflect mental accounting: goods are
assigned specific labels according to their categories, and budget constraints are specified for each
category, subject to the general constraint given by income. While the model has not been subject
yet to extensive empirical test, it nonetheless represents an ambitious attempt to give formal
specification to psychological principles that seem to rule everyday transactions, thus resulting
substantially richer than standard theory (incidentally, note that important prescriptive implications
for marketing can also be derived from the model).
A more comprehensive illustration of the mental accounting framework, fully inserted within the
general hedonic paradigm of Prospect Theory, and used to attempt a reinterpretation of various
anomalies and biases from such  perspective is in Thaler (forthcoming). The role of mental
accounting in saving behavior is discussed in Thaler (1990).
Reason-based choice
Another step toward more "constructive" approaches to decision making  are those contributions
which, starting from a perspective that further departs from the utility maximization paradigm,
focus upon the identification of the determinants of choice that lie beyond individuals’ limited
information processing abilities. In fact, while the empirical evidence on biases and heuristics
shows that choices are often sub-optimal and decision rules are not fully efficient, nonetheless  the
question of how preferences are shaped remains partly unanswered.
In this respect, not only context certainly matters in modifying the attractiveness of some options
relative to others (demonstrating once more the contingent nature of choice), but also one should be
able to trace some guiding principles on how attitudes toward alternatives are formed in the first
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place, especially in those cases (indeed the majority in real-life situations) in which the composition
of the choice set does not suggest some (absolute or relative) "optimum", and in which information
about stimuli is not given in terms of simple lists of attributes and unambiguous numerical ratings
(as it is usually the case in many experimental studies on decision making).
Indeed a whole alternative theoretical framework views the individual as making choices on the
basis of UHDVRQV, which may be internally-based or socially-induced, rather than on the basis of
introspection about her own underlying preferences. "It is a fundamental feature of human beings
that they have an image of themselves as DFWLQJ IRU D UHDVRQ" (Elster, (1998), p. 66, italics in
original).
Reason-based choice analysis is more familiar to fields such as history or political science, and it
usually involves reconstructing the decision maker’s assessment of  "reasons pro and con" different
options, the probable (often counterfactual) consequences of alternative courses of actions, and their
degree of "social" acceptability.
Shafir et al. (1993) is a seminal attempt to identify overlappings and differences between this
approach and the tradition (by and large prevailing in economic theory) of utility maximization, and
it investigates the role of  "reasons" in decision making through laboratory experiments. Their
findings show that, when faced with the need to choose, individuals often seek and construct
reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choices, both to themselves and to others.
Such reason-based choice behavior can sometimes lead to violations of intuitive principles of
rationality. For example, in one of their studies, the authors presented subjects with a choice
between two alternative offers of vacation packages over spring break. The two options were
carefully constructed so that one presented a series of average features (average weather, reasonable
night-life, medium-quality hotel, etc.), while the other presented both very good and very bad
features (gorgeous beaches, ultra-modern hotel, very strong winds, no nightlife, etc.). Half of the
subjects were then asked to FKRRVH one of the two options, while the other half was asked to UHMHFW
the same two options. Their findings show that the option with very good and very bad features was
both chosen and rejected significantly more often than the average option.
Shafir et al. argue that the result can be explained by assuming that when people are asked which
option to choose, they tend to focus on the positive features of each option, while when asked which
option to reject, they focus on the negative features instead. As a result, an option full of both
positive and negative features (an "enriched" option) relative to an option with very few positive
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and negative features (an "impoverished" option) will be both chosen and rejected more often (see
also Shafir, (1993a), for additional studies). In other words, the "enriched" option (spot B) offers
more reasons, compared to the impoverished option to justify both its choice and its rejection
(normatively speaking, the two tasks are formally equivalent)16.
Some of their related findings concern choice under conflict. People often experience a certain
amount of conflict when making choices. While this fact certainly appeals to everybody’s intuition
and experience, note that conflict is completely neglected by normative models of decision-making,
which assume that individuals are always able to assign utility values to alternatives and select the
highest-valued option.
Again, contrary to normative rules, in everyday situations individuals are not always able to assign
values to alternatives, they may not know how to tradeoff attributes (price against quality, for
example), and when faced with a choice between two options that seem equally attractive, they
often experience conflict17 . In this respect, conflict has a significant impact on choice, since it can
induce individuals to delay decisions, maintain the status quo, or seek additional information
incurring costs.
Again, the search for compelling reasons or arguments in favor of one alternative can constitute a
useful device.
Tversky and Shafir (1992a) ran some experiments in which they asked two different groups of
subjects to imagine wanting to buy a CD player and  passing by a store that is having a 1-day
clearance sale: The first group ORZFRQIOLFW) was asked to choose between buying a very popular
SONY Compact Disk player offered at $99, or defer the purchase to learn more about other models
available. The second group (KLJK FRQIOLFW) had to choose among the same Sony player, a more
sophisticated AIWA player priced at $169, and the same option to defer choice.
While in the first (ORZFRQIOLFW ) condition the majority of subjects (66%) decided to buy the CD
player, and only 34% of them decided to wait, in the KLJK FRQIOLFW condition, only 27% of the
subjects decided to buy the same CD player, and 46% of them decided to defer the purchase.
                                                     
16
 There is a close analogy between this finding and related findings in the domain of similarity judgments. Studies
(Tversky and Gati, (1978) have shown that when subjects are asked to judge how similar two objects are to each
other, they tend to focus on the objects’ common features, while if asked to judge how dissimilar the same two
objects are, the focus on each object’s distinctive features instead. As a result, in some cases the same two
objects may be judged both very similar in similarity judgments and very dissimilar in dissimilarity judgments.
17
 For a choice framework based on conflict resolution, see Hogarth, (1987).
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The results indicate that individuals are more likely to buy a product when they only have one
attractive option available.  In the high conflict condition, the presence of the two options involves a
conflict-triggering tradeoff. The conflict may not be easy to resolve, and many subjects thus prefer
to wait.
The low conflict condition, on the contrary, presents a unique very attractive alternative, and
therefore subjects are more inclined to choose it.
As the authors point out, these results also seem to demonstrate that, as conflict is often hard to
resolve, having more choice does not always make agents better off,  contrary to both economic
theory assumptions and common-sense intuition.
In other situations the presence of an additional option may have a positive effect on conflict
resolution.
Tversky and Shafir presented a third group of subjects a choice between the same popular SONY
player on sale for $99, an inferior AIWA player for the regular list price of $105, and the option to
defer choice to learn about other models. In this example  the second option is dominated by the
first one, since it is inferior in quality and costs more. Therefore, there is no conflict involved in the
comparison between the two alternatives, and the presence of the inferior option gives subjects a
compelling argument to choose the superior one. Consistently with the hypothesis, the large
majority of subjects (73%) decided to buy the SONY player in this situation, compared to the 27%
of subjects who chose the same option in the high conflict condition.
Shafir et al. (1993) also argue that several context effects such as the attraction effect (cf. section iii)
can be explained in terms of reasons.
The initial choice between two options that present a tradeoff is not trivial and may activate a
certain amount of conflict in the decision-maker, since there are no compelling arguments in favor
of one or the other.
Adding an asymmetrically dominated alternative can then resolve the conflict by providing a reason
to choose the option that dominates it. Simonson (1989) demonstrated that the attraction effect was
significantly stronger when subjects anticipated having to defend their decision. In this condition,
the dominant option looked like the easiest to justify.
Relatedly, extremeness aversion can be accounted for by assuming a "reason-seeking" behavior: in
the presence of options with extreme values on different dimensions, in fact, a middle option
represents a good compromise which  may be more easily justifiable than the extreme ones.
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Similarly, tradeoff contrast can be explained by assuming that people who experienced a certain
price-quality tradeoff in the past, when confronted with a better tradeoff (in which additional quality
"costs" relatively less), they have a good reason to select the high quality option for its relative
convenience.
Another striking result was found by Tversky and Shafir (1992b) in the domain of decision-making
under uncertainty.
University students were presented with the following dilemma: one group of subjects was asked to
imagine having just SDVVHG a tough qualifying examination and being offered the chance to
purchase a very attractive 5-day vacation package in Hawaii: students then had the choice between:
a) buying the vacation package
b) not buying the vacation package
c) paying a $5 non-refundable fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the
same exceptional price the day after tomorrow (Tversky and Shafir, 1992b)
A second group of subjects was given the exact same dilemma except that they had to imagine
having IDLOHG the exam. The three final options were the same  as in the first group.
More than half (54%) of the subjects chose to buy the vacation package in the SDVV version and even
a larger percentage (57%) did the same in the IDLO version.
A third group was then presented the same choice except that now the result of the exam was QRW
NQRZQ. The three options were:
a) buy the vacation package
b) not buy the vacation package
c) pay a $5 non-refundable fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the same
exceptional price the day after tomorrow-after you find out whether or not you passed the exam
(Tversky and Shafir, (1992b)).
In this last version, 61% of subjects preferred to pay the $5 fee and wait to find out whether or not
they had passed the exam.
Tversky and Shafir suggest that the result can again be explained in terms of reasons for choice. The
students in the SDVV and IDLO versions have definite reasons, although different, to buy the vacation
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package (a reward in the first case and a consolation in the second case). Most of them, in fact
choose to go to Hawaii. But when the outcome is not known, the lack of a clear reason for deciding
to go on vacation makes the decision more difficult. As a result, the majority of the students prefer
to pay and wait for information which, although irrelevant, (since they would choose to go to
Hawaii in either case),  provides them with a definite reason for choosing (Shafir et al., (1993)).
In this example, a reason-driven behavioral pattern is combined  with a general difficulty of
individuals at reasoning through GLVMXQFWLRQV, that is at correctly exploring and simultaneously
evaluating the consequences of  different branches of a decision tree (see also Shafir, (1994)).
An implication of such result is that individuals in several situations may actively seek and pay for
information that is virtually irrelevant in terms of its actual effects on their final decisions.
The phenomenon of reason-based choice is tightly linked with the issue of social accountability of
decisions. While reviewing the literature on social accountability is beyond the aim of this paper, we
recommend Tetlock (1992) for an insightful discussion.
A contingent framework
In an attempt to provide an integrated approach to decision making, Bettman, Luce and Payne
(forthcoming) propose a "contingent framework" for understanding consumer choice, reviewing and
explaining empirical evidence in that light.
Their main point is the inherently constructive nature of both consumers’ preferences and choice
processes.
Preferences are constructed because individuals often lack the knowledge and ability to develop
well-defined preferences valid D SULRUL. In addition, choices are usually made in order to
accomplish multiple goals. The main goals which determine choices according to the authors are:
maximizing the accuracy of a choice, minimizing the cognitive effort it implies, minimizing the
experience of negative emotion associated to a choice, and maximizing its justifiability to
themselves or to others. The relative importance assigned to each goal will be determined by a
variety of contingent factors, including the importance of the decision, ambiguity of the feedback
relative to the degree of accomplishment of each goal, and the degree of accountability for the
decision. Given an array of different goals, then choice strategies will then be judged in their
advantages and disadvantages with respect to reaching different goals in a given situation. The
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consumer will select the choice strategy that maximizes the advantages with respect to the most
important goal in the specific decision task.
 The authors introduce a measure for accuracy (based on each strategy’s relative distance from the
weighted adding model) and effort (measured by the number of elementary information processes
each strategy requires) according to which strategies can be valued, and they make predictions about
when a set of major strategies will be used according to the consumer’s relative preference for
accuracy over effort.
They subsequently specify situations in which one set of goals is likely to result more salient than
others; more specifically, situations where accuracy and effort goals predominate and situations in
which, on the contrary, maximizing the ease of justification or minimizing negative emotion might
prevail.
Several other empirical facts like the ones described in the previous section, are then re-interpreted
from this perspective.
The authors’ framework is extremely rich as it explicitly addresses the problem of both consumers’
goals and the impact of emotions on choice18. The interpretation of goals in this view is consistently
diverging from the one stemming from standard utility theory and also from the related
multiattribute utility models (MAUT). In fact, while MAUT postulate conflicting goals guiding the
decision  maker simply by identifying them with the assignment of partial utility values to single
attributes ("how much more do I value safety in a car compared to convenience?") whose weight on
choice is eventually resolved in a tradeoff,  goals in this contingent framework are essentially meta-
goals ("do I really want to tradeoff safety against money?"), which, much more than just
determining overall utility values, intervene in shaping preferences, selection of choice strategies
and, of course, outcomes.
Several aspect still remain unspecified and need further investigation, however. Among others, this
framework does not address the nature of problem representations and the principles which govern
their formation. This is indeed the central concern of the theories which explicitly address the nature
of mental representations.
V. Mental models in consumer behavior
                                                     
18
 The role of emotions in choice behavior is an issue for long neglected by economists. However, see Elster,
(1998), for an assessment of the role of emotions in economic behavior.
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Most "high-level" cognition involves some process by which subjects form and modify mental
representations in order to understand and manage a reality which is generally too complex and
uncertain to be grasped in its entirety (see also the discussion in Aversi et al., (1999), this volume).
Studying mental representations is crucial in the understanding of aspects which go from concept
formation, to memory, inference and judgment. That is why mental representations have been a
focal interest across different branches of psychology, cognitive science, philosophy and artificial
intelligence.
"A crucial question for theories of thinking concerns UHOHYDQFH: How do people access and exploit knowledge relevant
to their goals when drawing inferences, making decisions, or solving problems?" (Holyoak and Spellman, (1993), p.
293).
The answers to this question are diverse: studies on reasoning have seen recent theories reject the
traditional rule-based approaches and claim that human inference is based on (often incomplete)
PHQWDOPRGHOV of the premises (Johnson-Laird, (1983)). Students of artificial intelligence have on
their part tried to identify and formalize the rules that govern the structure of representations both in
human and artificial organisms (Holland et al., (1986)). Studies on memory and cognition  have
shown that information about the world is usually stored and retrieved according  to hierarchical or
cluster-type structures of categories (Rosch, (1978), Lakoff, (1987)).
Economics has paid very little attention to these themes (an exception being Marengo and
Tordjman, (1996), on the evolution of mental models in financial markets). The reasons for that
probably have to do, among other things, with the particular nature of the research. It is rare to
derive in this vein simple formal theories which make sharp predictions and which can be readily
translated into a set of coherent axioms.
Inherent to all disciplines that deal with the representation of knowledge is the idea that humans
face an environment which is complex, multifaceted, only partly understood and constantly
changing. Complexity and novelty are hard to translate in formal theories; hence mathematically-
based social sciences have largely attempted to skip the problem by relying on a sort of generalized
"small world assumption" (Savage, (1954)), which postulates a finite set of possible states and
related priors (in consumption theory the set of states is composed of the consumption bundles
available to the consumer) present H[DQWH in the mind of the agent and whose truth or falsity the
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agent learns as a consequence of a Bayesian process of inference (or, PXWDWLV PXWDQGLV, whose
utility maximizing bundle is selected by applying an optimization algorithm; see Dosi et al.,(1996),
for a discussion).
In this respect, even most of what now is called behavioral economics implicitly maintains this
fundamental assumption about the world it tries to model.
On the contrary, in a world with radical (not probabilizable) uncertainty, and constant flows of
innovation which render the set of possible states notionally infinite, it is a plausible conjecture that
individuals try to cope by mapping the structure of the environment into fuzzy (and often partial)
mental isomorphisms from which inductive generalizations are drawn through heuristic processes.
"Although mental models are based in part on static prior knowledge, they are themselves, transient, dynamic
representations of particular unique situations. They exist only implicitly, corresponding to the organized, multifaceted
description of the current situation and the expectations that flow from it"  (Holland et al., (1986), p.14).
Notwithstanding the relevance of mental models in most aspects of human cognition,  the issue is
still largely unexplored with respect to decision making, especially by those behavioral scientists
who operate within the "deviation from perfect rationality" paradigm. On the other hand, it is
sufficient to take even a short look at journals of marketing and consumer behavior to realize that
the amount of experimental and empirical studies devoted at understanding consumers’
representation of knowledge is enormous.
The following section briefly lists some of these contributions, which specifically address the
problem of how relevant knowledge is encoded, organized and elicited in a cognitive system.
Interrelations with decision making are highlighted.
Focusing effect and mental models in decision making
A basic tenet of normative models of choice states that the decision maker is always able to evaluate
all available alternatives: In real-life situations, however, this is rarely the case. The first, and most
obvious reason has to do with the fact that individuals only know a subset of all the potentially
feasible options. The second reason is more subtle and has to do with the way our mind is
structured. Experiments have shown that individuals in some cases may simply fail to consider their
entire space of alternatives, unless somewhat induced to do so explicitly. An analogous
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phenomenon emerges in the context of reasoning, where the failure to consider all the relevant
dimensions of a problem leads individuals to commit systematic fallacies.
In a seminal study of the interaction between reasoning and decision making, Legrenzi et al. (1995)
asked a group of subjects to imagine being offered to choose whether or not to go to the movies,
knowing the experimenter could provide them with all the information they needed in order to
decide.
The majority of subjects asked several questions about the movie, totally neglecting the "or not" part
of the choice: That is, subjects focused on getting more information about the activity that had been
explicitly mentioned ("going to the movies"), completely failing to consider any alternatives that
had been left implicit in the proposal (for example, going to theater, to the opera, and so forth).
This is a simple but powerful example of the so-called "focusing effect", a phenomenon initially
detected in the area of deductive reasoning which seems to depend on the partiality of the
individuals’ mental encoding of information.
Of course, one possibility is always to place this phenomenon under the broad and somewhat
residual heading of "distorsions and imperfections in information processing". An alternative, in our
view much more promising, is on the contrary to begin to explicitly disentangle the "cognitive
blackbox".
On the grounds of experimental evidence on deductive and inductive inference, Johnson-Laird
(1983) has proposed an approach to logical reasoning based on the idea of mental models.
According to his theory, originally aimed at explaining human deduction (see also Johnson-Laird
and Byrne, (1991)), individuals do not perform reasoning tasks by applying syntactic rules. Rather,
they reason by constructing mental models of the situation expressed in the premises of a problem,
enriching them with their general knowledge about the world. They subsequently derive a tentative
conclusion on the basis of such models, and try to build counter-examples of models in which the
conclusion might be false. If no such models can be found, they assume that the conclusion is
correct. Such semantic (rather than syntactic) process can lead individuals to make both correct and
incorrect inferences, mainly depending on how the model-construction phase is performed. For
example, studies have shown that individuals have difficulties in explicitly representing premises
stated in form of negation, or in modeling information which is left implicit but can nonetheless be
immediately derived from the premises. Such difficulties in "fleshing out" all the relevant states of
affairs can be generalized to the domain of decision making, if one makes the hypothesis (indeed,
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quite plausible), that many decisions we make in daily life depend on some form of reasoning19 (for
example, seeking and encoding information, making inferences, selecting and applying choice
criteria, etc.). "If individuals reason in order to make decisions, then phenomena that occur in
reasoning should occur in making judgments and decisions" (Legrenzi et al., (1993), p. 38). An
extension of the "focusing" effect to consumer choice concerns the consumer’s treatment of
information about products. Experiments (Kardes et al. (1990)) have shown that consumers tend to
completely neglect missing information about a product, even in those cases in which the
information, if present, would have a large impact on the consumer’s evaluation process and
subsequent choice. Slovic (1972) suggests a "concreteness" principle to explain such phenomenon.
Schemas and scripts
Interest in the study of mental representations among consumer researchers has largely progressed
as the shortcomings of the information processing approach have been increasingly recognized. The
acknowledged partiality of an approach which sees the consumer as a boundedly rational, but
nonetheless conscious and analytical problem solver, has focused the attention on the identification
of the basic cognitive structures which shape preferences, attitudes, and in turn consumption
behavior, according to an approach which may be loosely defined as WRSGRZQ, in contrast with the
piecemeal, ERWWRPXS approach of the information processing view. According to the top-down
view, problem solving in general and decision making in particular is tightly linked to higher-level
knowledge structures and frames that shape the entire perception of the task and subsequent
"performance" (Gardner, (1985); see, e.g., Nakamoto, (1987), for a discussion of these different
approaches to consumer research). The key feature is that such link cannot be entirely reduced to
some computational and analytical encoding procedure, but, on the contrary, it is at least partly
"holistic" and "global" in nature (see, e.g., Cohen and Basu, (1987)). In consumer behavior, this
traduces itself in the fact that information about products is structured in terms of larger "chunks",
which are stored in memory as relatively unitary entities coupled with global evaluations or
affective responses which often cannot be decomposed in their single elements (the opposite of
what is postulated, by, e.g., multiattribute utility theory). For example, consumer researchers have
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 Interactions between reasoning and decision making are still to be largely tapped. For a critical assessment and
review, see Johnson-Laird and Shafir, (1993).
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identified two basic modalities for stimuli evaluation: piecemeal processing and category-based
processing (Fiske, (1982); Fiske and Pavel, (1986)), which are used, alternatively or in combination,
depending on variables such as the level of expertise, and the degree of matching between
information encountered and previous expectations (Sujan, (1985)). While the former processing
rule recalls the bottom-up, computational view (consisting in attribute by attribute evaluations
which are combined according to some compensatory or sequential strategy), the latter usually
involves a much more intuitive and (often automatic) process of instance-class comparison and
transfer to the instance itself of some category-based global evaluations, much more in tune with the
top-down approach above mentioned. The key empirical question then concerns precisely the
identification of the characteristics of such knowledge structures and their role in judgment and
evaluation. In this vein, both cognitive and social psychology offer a wide range of
conceptualizations: among the most widely applied in  consumer research are the notions of
schemas, scripts and categories.
Schemas are generally represented as hierarchical structures for the encoding and storage of
information, with higher levels including more generic knowledge and lower levels containing more
specific information about particular instances of a concept (see, e.g., Taylor and Crocker, (1981)).
Researchers often distinguish schemas as organized structures having both spatial and temporal
dimensions, from categories, usually intended as taxonomic classifications of objects. When the
temporal dimension is relatively more prominent, schemas are usually referred to as VFULSWV,
intended as stereotypical sequences of events with associated a set of routinized expectations and
rules of behavior. For example, a script for a typical activity such as "going to the restaurant" will
activate both a series of expectations (we expect the waiter to come to our table and take orders),
and a repertoire of pre-stored action sequences (sitting at the table, ordering meals, eating, etc.).
The key role of schematic structures of information is to provide expectations about a class of
events, which are then translated to novel instances, whenever encountered. The role of schemas, in
short, is both providing an interpretation of stimuli and guiding inference, e.g. providing pre-stored
expectations in substitution for missing information.
With respect to product classes, studies have shown that consumers, through familiarity and
expertise, develop schemas of expectations which may include assessment of average values for
each relevant attribute, determination of the attributes’ relative importance, and the degree of
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variability of different brands around some median or modal value (Meyers-Levy and Tybout,
(1989); Peracchio and Tybout, (1996)). The degree of congruity between schema-based expectations
and experience with a product is crucial in the post-trial evaluation and classification. Low degrees
of congruity may be likely to activate new schemas H[QRYR (see, e.g. Stayman et al. (1992), and
Sujan and Bettman, (1989)), while high degrees of congruity are likely to result in the product
assimilation into pre-existing schemas.
The role of schema congruity in evaluation is also crucial: studies (Fiske, (1982)) have shown that
an instance is rated as more preferable when it is partly inconsistent with schema-expectations that
when it is highly consistent. However, further investigation is needed.
Categories
The notion of category has known a wide use in the area of cognitive science, particularly in relation
to domains such as concept formation, learning and memory. Categories and categorization
processes  also play an essential role in consumer settings. Most advertising efforts by firms to
communicate specialized "positionings" for their products in the market may be read as attempts to
influence consumers’ judgments of category membership for those products.
Among the various models of categorization that can be found in cognitive psychology, the
SURWRW\SLFDOPRGHO is by and large the most widely applied in research on consumer behavior. Let us
start with some brief remarks about the model, before referring more in detail to its applications to
consumer behavior.
According to the prototypical model (Rosch, (1978)), categories serve two basic functions  in
human cognition: the first is a function of cognitive economy. By classifying a stimulus as instance
of a given category one is able to retrieve a considerable amount of information about that particular
stimulus. One purpose of categorization is thus to reduce the infinite diversity of the environment to
cognitively tractable proportions. The second principle of categorization pertains to the structure of
the perceived world. Combinations of attributes in the perceived world do not appear uniformly, but
according to a highly correlational structure that forms natural discontinuities (so, for example, the
pair of attributes ZLQJV and IHDWKHUV has a higher probability of co-occurring compared to ZLQJV and
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IXU). Categories can be thought of as concepts or images reflecting such discontinuities in a
cognitive system.
In the prototypical model, categories are structured according to two levels.
The vertical level differentiates categories according to their degrees of abstraction (for example,
the categories *HUPDQ VKHSKHUG, GRJ, PDPPDO, DQLPDO, OLYLQJ EHLQJ are situated at increasing
abstraction levels), thus forming hierarchical structures characterized by inclusiveness relations.
Categories at higher levels (or superordinate categories) include instances that share only a limited
number of general and abstract attributes and otherwise differ in many respects (both a giraffe and
Bill Clinton can be categorized as OLYLQJEHLQJV), while categories at lower levels (or subordinate
categories) contain instances that usually share a high degree of similarity (all German shepherds
are likely to resemble each other).
Various experiments (Rosch et al., (1976)) have shown that a particular level exists at which
individuals normally tend to categorize items: Such GHIDXOWOHYHOof categorization (the basic level)
corresponds to the concrete objects.
For example, if one is shown a picture of a chair and he is asked to name the object he is looking at,
his most likely answer will be "a chair" (EDVLFOHYHO), although in theory he might as well respond:
"It’s a piece of furniture" (VXSHURUGLQDWH OHYHO), or "it’s a red, plastic, office chair" (VXERUGLQDWH
OHYHO). The particular "salience" of the basic level in dividing the perceived world into separate
entities derives from it being the level which allows both the greatest intra-categorical homogeneity
and the greatest inter-categorical differentiation. Besides, experiments have demonstrated that the
EDVLFOHYHO is the level at which children first learn to perform categorization tasks (Mervis and Pani,
(1980)).
The horizontal level corresponds to varying degrees of typicality. In this sense, what distinguishes
the prototypical and all subsequent models from the classical (or Aristotelian) view on
categorization is the absence of clear-cut inter-categorical boundaries. Category membership, rather
than being a binary variable, is a matter of grade: instances of the same category are generally
perceived to be differently typical or representative of that category (URELQfor example, is normally
perceived as a more typical bird than SHQJXLQ. Each category has a graded structure that
corresponds to the different degrees of typicality of its members, with more typical instances lying
at the core, and less typical ones at the borders (Rosch and Mervis, (1975)).
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Definition of prototypicality in Rosch’s model is closely associated with the notion of IDPLO\
UHVHPEODQFH, an idea originally introduced by  Wittgenstein (1953). Family resemblance of an
instance to its category is higher, the higher the number of attributes it shares with members of the
same category, and the lower the number of attributes it shares with members of contrasting
categories (note that Tversky (1977) provides a formal definition of prototypicality in terms of
family resemblance using the contrast model of similarity (cf. section iii)).
Prototypes in other words are formed according to the same two principles that govern the
formation of categories themselves: the highest amount of category information and the maximum
inter-category differentiation are achieved in correspondence of prototypes. In addition, prototypical
members share a number of interesting properties: Mervis and Rosch (1981) has shown that
individuals tend to classify prototypes more easily and faster as members of  a category than non-
prototypes, and tend to use prototypes more often than non-prototypes as cognitive reference points
in comparisons (Rosch, (1975b)). Furthermore, prototypes are often perceived to possess a greater
number of valued attributes (Ward and Loken, (1988)).
The notion of typicality is particularly relevant to consumer research. Given the evaluative context
of most product categorization tasks, category-based attitudes and preferences are likely to be
maximally activated in correspondence of prototypical members. Therefore, for example, similarity
of a product to some prototypical exemplar may greatly determine the product’s degree of
acceptance among consumers.
In fact, it seems to be established by a number of studies in marketing and consumer behavior that a
positive relationship exists between typicality and preference in a variety of product categories
(Ward and Loken, (1988); Nedungadi and Hutchinson, (1985)). Hence the great importance of
typicality as a measure of a product’s expected success in the market.
The vertical level: hierarchies and decision rules
Categories are mentally organized as hierarchical structures with different levels of abstraction. In
much the same way, product categories can be ordered according to their degree of abstraction and
inclusiveness relations (Howard, (1989)).
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Product hierarchies are important when studying sequential heuristics or agendas. In fact, this class
of decision rules is characterized by partitions of the choice menu and a sequential elimination of
subsets. In some cases, the structure of the product hierarchy can provide the natural basis for the
partition criterion. Typically, the consumer first selects the higher level (or superordinate) category
and then proceeds along the tree representation of alternatives to select among subcategories (see, e.
g., Devetag et al., (1996)).
Levels of categorization have a direct impact on choice heuristics, in that they partly determine
which class of choice strategies will be used in a particular decision task. Choices that involve
products belonging to the same (basic or lowel level) category are more likely to involve attribute-
by-attribute comparisons, while choice strategies to select among options belonging to different
categories  may be more constructive in nature and rely on processes by which concrete attributes
are transformed into more abstract dimensions on which a comparison might be possible  (Johnson,
(1984)).
Often what distinguishes choices among comparable (same category) options from choices between
noncomparable ones (different categories) is the availability of pre-established decision criteria in
the former case versus the need to contruct them in the latter case (Bettman and Sujan, (1987)).
Sometimes options may belong to the same superordinate class, or they may be compared on the
basis of how well they satisfy the same goal (Johnson and Fornell, (1987); Johnson, (1989)).
Individuals often tend to compare products on the basis of abstract attributes even when a
comparison on more concrete attributes is possible (Corfman, (1991)).
The horizontal level: prototypes and preference formation
The relevance of prototypes as organizing principles around which many processes of judgment,
comparison, perception and attitude formation are constructed has been pointed out in several
psychological studies, which, considered jointly, highlight striking similarities in the results (see
Kahneman et al, (1998)).
Judgments of probability are often conducted on the basis of how representative an instance is of a
certain class (Tversky and Kahneman, (1983)). Perceived typicality is also the basis of individuals’
responses in several category-based inductive arguments (see Osherson et al., (1990); Rips, (1975);
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Shafir et al., (1990b); Smith et al., (1993); ). Attitudes towards objects or collections or similar
objects are likewise shown to depend on perceptions of prototypicality (Kahneman et al., (1998)).
In consumer choice settings, typicality matters a great deal in shaping perception of product classes,
expectation formation and, of course, preferences. Some examples of such typicality-driven
preference patterns can be found to manifest themselves at the market level.
If someone is asked to recall a brand of soft-drink, Coca-Cola will be in most cases the first one to
come to mind. In the US, the verb "to xerox" a document comes from a famous brand of copy
machine. Samsonite has by now become a synonymous for a rigid suitcase typically used for air
travels.
What these examples all have in common is  that being the first entrants in a new market has given
these brands a special  prominent position in the consumers’ minds: some brands have actually
become synonymous for the entire product category.
This particular prominence traduces itself in a greater market share that first entrants in a market
usually have and keep over time, even when better competing products become eventually available
(Kardes et al., (1993)).
As traditional economic explanations, such as entry barriers and consumers’ switching costs are not
sufficient to give full account of the magnitude of the pioneering advantage, another, more cognitive
explanation has been advanced which applies the notion of prototypicality.
The first entrant in a new market has a great impact on the process of preference formation,
especially in case of innovative products.
The pioneer is often the first, and initially the only source of information that the consumer has on
the new product category: This uniqueness gives the pioneer a great cognitive advantage over the
competitors, in that it structures the perception of the product category in the consumer’s mind and it
establishes the "ideal" composition of attribute values for the entire class. Besides, the pioneer has a
high probability of becoming the SURWRW\SH of the new category, and, being the process of  category
formation for product classes often choice-oriented, a high degree of prototypicality is likely to be
associated with a high degree of preference (Carpenter and Nakamoto, (1988)).
Moreover, the prototype usually becomes the standard of comparison against which all new
competitors are valued.
Various experiments have shown the impact  of order-of-entry effects on preferences; the first
mover’s advantage seems to be highest when product quality is ambiguous and related more to
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symbolic aspects (such as status, prestige, etc.) than to technical ones (Carpenter and Nakamoto,
(1989)). In addition, pioneering brands are usually recalled from memory faster and more frequently
than followers, hence the pioneer is more likely than followers to enter the consumer’s mental set of
options to be considered for purchase (Kardes et al., (1993)).
Alternative views on categorization
While the prototype model of categorization, based on typicality and family resemblance as
measures of membership degree, is the most widely used in the marketing and consumer psychology
literature, other models have been given consideration, in which particular relevance is given to
context in defining category membership (see Cohen and Basu, (1987)).
While classic prototype models consider categories as relatively stable and de-contextualized
entities, Barsalou (1983) adopts a much more contingent and subjective perspective on the issue of
categorization.
According to his view, categories often exist in relation to a goal. Examples may include "things to
take to a picnic", or "things to eat on a diet", or others. Note that in this type of categories,
membership is not defined on the basis of similarity, but in relation to the degree of satisfaction of
the same goal.
Such goal-derived categories are much less stable and have much fuzzier boundaries than "natural"
(or prototype) categories. They often emerge in response to contingencies, and they may include
members of different natural categories.
Most of the categories that we consider in purchase situations are partly goal-derived in nature. The
notion of prototype differs too according to the presence of absence of a goal (our prototype of the
natural category FKDLU may be very different from the prototypical - or LGHDO - chair that one has in
mind when considering the purchase of new furniture for the living-room). Experiments show that
the former generally depends on the degree to which an instance possesses commonly shared
attributes within the category, while the latter depends on judgment of the item’s contribution to
goal achievement, and on the frequency with which the item has been encountered as a member of
the category in the past (Barsalou, (1985)).
More recent contributions further stress the relevance of context-dependent factors in consumers’
category judgments (see Cohen and Basu, (1987); Thompson, (1989)).
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What emerges from these studies is the fact that categorization in consumer settings distinguishes
itself by being essentially functional to specific goals and evaluation purposes. Therefore,
classifications of products into categories may depend on objective, feature-based comparisons as
well as on evaluative needs (for example, wine may be either classified according to the subsets of
UHG and ZKLWH, or, alternatively, in ORZTXDOLW\ and  KLJKTXDOLW\or possibly both criteria together).
"Since consumers’ interaction with various products usually occurs in an evaluative context, categorization and
evaluation may be interwined from the very formation of the category. Subsequent affective responses to products, then,
may be derived from their identification as a member of a particular category" (Cohen and Basu, (1987), p. 456).
An interesting model that belongs to the class of probabilistic models of categorization has been
developed by Holland et al. (1986). According to the authors, categories are formed by clusters of
rules organized in default hierarchies. Each stimulus we encounter is first classified according to
higher level categories, which will provide us with "default" expectations, that is expectations that
are considered valid so long as they are not contradicted by more specific information about that
stimulus. So, for example, knowing that X is a bird will activate a set of default expectations about
X ("it has wings, it flies, and so forth"). If subsequently we are told that X is a penguin or an ostrich,
more specific expectations will be activated which contradict some of the default ones ("penguins
and ostrichs do not fly"). The approach underlying the model of default hierarchies is more
pragmatic and linked to problem solving compared to Rosch’s model, even though it retains many of
its features (namely, the organization of categories in hierarchical structures and the centrality of
prototypes).
Categorization and decision processes: some interconnections
When new products appear on the market, the first information available to consumers is highly
critical in determining their judgments of category membership for those products.
Howard (1989) considers the whole categorization process and the subsequent purchase decision as
a problem solving procedure having different levels of difficulty and complexity in correspondence
of each period of  the product life cycle. Usually the first stage (H[WHQVLYH SUREOHP VROYLQJ)
corresponds to the phase of introduction of a new product in the market, and requires the greatest
cognitive effort. Consumers initially do not have familiarity with the new product and, since they
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have to form a concept of it, they tend to assimilate it to existing categories. Therefore, properties of
the selected categories will be thought to characterize the new exemplar as well.
Subsequently, through usage experience, consumers develop new ad hoc judgment criteria to
evaluate the product and to differentiate it from existing categories. This is the phase during which a
new category gradually develops.
The second stage (OLPLWHGSUREOHPVROYLQJ) is the one corresponding to more advanced phases of the
life cycle. Since evaluation criteria have already been established, consumers must only position
each new brand in the space defined by the relevant attributes. Cognitive effort is limited at this
stage.
Finally, the last stage (URXWLQH SUREOHP VROYLQJ), occurs at the maturity level of the product life
cycle. The consumer in this phase adopts quasi-automatic decision rules that require the minimum
effort (e.g., simple rules such as "buy the brand you bought last time", or ’buy the brand that is most
easily available at your usual store", etc.)
Categorization has also a crucial influence on the process of information acquisition. Experiments
(Ozanne et al., 1992) have shown that the degree of congruity between a product and expectations
associated to its category greatly determines consumers’ search of additional information regarding
that product. If there is a partial mismatch between the product characteristics and category
expectations, the search for information will continue until the mismatch is resolved either by
including the product in the initial class or by activating a new category for it.
Further connections between categorization and decision making have not been fully uncovered and
nonetheless deserve more extensive investigation. An area to explore regards the incompleteness of
representations. For example, the neglect of opportunity costs in consumer choice (cf. section iv)
may not depend only on the "hedonic" asymmetric treatment of gains and losses entailed by
Prospect Theory, but also on the failure to consider possibilities that lie outside the decision maker’s
range of more "salient" options. In fact, taking into account opportunity costs presupposes being
able to actively imagine alternative uses of money, which may not be in the decision maker’s
habitual cognitive repertoire, unless triggered by some contingent occurrence.
Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of context in determining category membership
for products. Clearly, the way we classify items depends among other factors on the context in
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which the task is performed and on its goals. Therefore the categorization of a product may be
subject to all sorts of manipulations of contextual factors, much like in the case of choice.
The definition of a basic level for product categories is itself even more problematic than for so-
called natural categories. What is the basic level for the category "computer"? Are laptop and
desktop computers further specifications or basic level categories themselves? Various reasons
suggest that levels of abstractions themselves are rather flexible and contingent on the particular
nature of the task and of the environment (see Holland et al., (1986)).
Finally, prototypicality for product categories still needs further investigation, especially in relation
to processes of judgment and choice. Experiments have demonstrated the role of typicality in
determining a series of reasoning fallacies. More research should be aimed at testing if typicality
affects decision making in a way which may result in violations of normative rules. Given the
comparative nature of most human decision processes, and given the centrality of prototypes as
cognitive reference points, it seems compelling to look for violations of normative standards given
by exemplar-prototype comparisons in choice tasks (for a recent study on prototype-based judgment
"fallacies" in dollar responses to public issues, see Kahneman et al., (1998)).
Study of categorization would be useful also in order to understand phenomena like mental
accounting. In fact, the criterion by which mental accounts are created seems to be given by a
categorization of the different types of expenditures according to temporal or situational constraints.
Such categorization responds to pragmatic as well as "hedonic" needs. Certain types of partition
criteria, however, are likely to result more salient than others for most individuals. For example, is
there something corresponding to a "basic level" used for budget allocation? A better knowledge of
categorization in such contexts would shed more light on the "editing" of the mental accounting
system and allow to draw sharper predictions about how people classify and encode expenditures.
  Finally, the emergence of reference-dependence and other recurring patterns in apparently different
domains (e.g., utility assessment in terms of variations   from a reference level, product evaluations
based on various procedures of "anchoring" on other products in the reference set,   reference-based
similarity judgments, categorization based on prototype-instance matching, etc.) is strongly
suggestive of an underlying unitariety of most human cognitive processes, whose further
exploration promises as a highly fascinating research program, both in its own right, and for its
implications in terms of formal modeling.
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VI. Some concluding remarks on the state of the art and a research agenda
Research on consumer behavior is immense and extremely diversified. The main purpose of this
survey has been to provide a critical assessment of selected evidence on consumer decision making
which should be taken into account in building alternative micro-foundations of consumption
behavior, and to describe some of the most fruitful attempts to create alternative frameworks
starting from such evidence.
Several themes have been left out of the survey for reasons of space, but are nonetheless crucial for
a behavioral theory of consumption. Learning, in particular, is a key aspect that virtually involves all
phases of decision making: various experiments have been conducted which test the role of
knowledge and expertise (acquired through learning and familiarity with the product class) in the
overall quality of decision making. The effects of learning and expertise are nonetheless somehow
ambiguous and still have to be clarified. If choices change with learning, is it because individuals
learn to apply more efficient decision rules, or because they develop more stable - and therefore less
context-dependent - preferences over time? Or do they learn to refine their mental representations in
a way more capable of reflecting the complexity of the environment? Probably all of the above
apply, and more research is needed in order to disentangle the single effects (see, e.g., Dosi et al.,
(1996), for a review of learning theories).
 Let us conclude with a few remarks on what we believe might be promising future developments of
economic models of consumption towards a more sound psychological foundation, in the light of
what has already been done (indeed a lot, but not enough) on such grounds.
The scarce empirical content of many (if not all) assumptions underlying microeconomic theories of
consumer choice is being recognized as a well-established fact by an increasing number of theorists,
hence the point does not need to be overemphasized here. However, once such theoretical
shortcomings are acknowledged, the question of what to do about it still remains a crucial one, to
which answers essentially differ on how much should be retained of standard theories and how
much should be discarded. At one extreme, the more conservative approaches basically aim at
preserving the standard decision-theoretic framework by introducing modifications in the argument
of the utility function or by relaxing some of the less normatively compelling axioms. However, it is
not clear to what extent such hybrids are able to assure an effective gain in descriptive validity, and
where should the limit be placed to the modification of the current axiomatic construction.
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Other approaches explicitly take the other way around and, starting from the empirical evidence,
extract some general behavioral principles which are then translated into (quasi-axiomatic) micro-
foundations of alternative theories. The most successful and influential result of such approaches is
indeed Prospect Theory and its adaptations to consumer decision making. To the same line of
research belong the various attempts to model intertemporal choice (see Loewenstein and Elster,
(1992)). The paradigm of utility-based modeling is retained, although utility itself is redefined,
refining on the basis of Bentham’s original hedonic interpretation (see Kahneman et al., (1997)).
Notwithstanding the relevance of these theoretical contributions in the development of behavioral
models in economic theorizing, there are still several aspects which are left out of these frameworks
(some of which have been discussed here), and which, we believe, should be taken on board by
behavioral consumpthion models in one way or the other.
More effort should be put in trying to incorporate the contingent nature of most decision processes
and by rendering their mechanisms more explicit, while the issue is still often avoided by
postulating the maximization of some "behaviorally-adjusted" utility  function. In this respect,
Shafir et al. (1990a) and Tversky and Simonson (1993) are fruitful attempts to capture the
fundamentally contingent and comparative nature of most decision strategies.
Likewise, probabilistic models like Elimination-by-Aspects or Pretree (cf. section iii) are refined
mathematical tools to formalize processes of hierarchical selection. The Contrast Model of
Similarity (Tversky, (1977); Tversky and Gati, (1978)) is a sharp and parsimonious model of
perceived similarity, which is often  the basis for cognitive processes  that involve recognition and
classification of stimuli.
Indeed, a major message of the foregoing discussion concerns the interpretative advancements
already achieved by empirically-disciplined "reduced form" representations of choice processes,
which exhibit varying degrees of departure from the standard model, while still maintaining a
somewhat similar conception of the decision maker as (imperfect) utility maximizer. However, in
this work we have also argued that it might be necessary to move a further step ahead.
As Eldar Shafir points out:
"As a consequence of WKH WHQVLRQEHWZHHQQRUPDWLYHSUHGLFWLRQVDQGHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFH, several alternative theories
have been developed that try to effect a synergy between the normative and the descriptive; these theories retain some of
the more normatively appealing principles, like dominance and invariance, while relaxing others, like independence and
transitivity. It is not clear, however, who these theories are about. They are not about superrational agents, because WKH\
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behave in conformity with all the principles and have no good reason to give up any. .....At the same time, these revised
theories are not about real people because we, it appears, systematically violate all the principles, including some of the
normatively indispensable ones..." (Shafir, (1993), p. 277, italics added).
One way of facing the challenge of a full-fledged descriptive theory is precisely to explicitly account
for the cognitive (and eventually also the emotional) structures and processes underlying behaviors
and choices. In turn, that involves modeling mental representations, whether seen in terms of mental
models, categories, or clusters of rules. We believe that the phenomena related to the formation and
evolution of (possibly, socially shared) mental representations is one of the greatest challenges for
economics. Accepting the challenge, however, implies an even more radical abandonment of several
reassuring conceptions of the economic agents which still abound among economists.
 Individuals do not live in a "small world" with a finite set of completely specified options, known a
priori in all their relevant characteristics and consequences. Rather, they face an open environment
which is far more complex and diversified than their bounded rationality is able to grasp. They face
continuos flows of novelty and rely on partial isomorphisms to generate default expectations and
rules and behavior. At the same time, individuals are not simply passive recipients of environmental
stimuli, or (imperfect) information processing machines. Rather, they actively interpret their own
experience and confer meaning to the reality in which they live. Rather than maximizing exogenous
and well-behaved preferences and utilities defined over commodity bundles, individuals exhibit (or
better, construct) attitudes towards events and objects in so far as these are cognitively perceived as
belonging to some more abstract concepts, categories or ideas (see Kahneman et al., (1998)).
Moreover,  concepts and categories evolve over time as a result of learning, appearence of novelties,
acquiring of new information and social communication.
Therefore, preferences as the term is used in economics may be the result of quite inductive and
context-dependent processes in which goal-driven mental models, prototype-based expectations
interact with intuitive (nonanalytical) heuristics and various processes of (ex-post?) rationalization.
Almost every cognitive act is nested into some type of representation. As Holland (1986) puts it,
"people and machines must represent variability in some way, and any future theories of induction must come to grips
with the question of variability representation and processing" (Holland et al., 1986, p.).
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We believe that consumption models should try to be more explicitly grounded into general theories
of induction. We have no ready answer for how this should be achieved. Our sole aim is to raise the
issue and to provide some suggestions on possible fruitful directions.
Some help may come from those theories which  have been repeatedly tested empirically and which
provide a coherent set of general principles likely to hold across different cognitive domains.
Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory is one of these. In addition, the probabilistic models of
categorization (whether based on feature co-occurrences or default expectations) also possess a
reasonable degree of generality and some of their theoretical constructs might be included in models
which try to explicit consumers’ knowledge in terms of clustered regularities.
In this respect, the model of default hierarchies proposed by Holland et al. may be considered as a
part of a more general theory of induction which embraces aspects as diverse as probabilistic
inference, learning, analogy, problem solving and stereotyping, within a general rule-based
framework that combines results in disciplines ranging from psychology to biology to artificial
intelligence. Its substantial degree of generality and flexibility renders it also well suited to model
knowledge representation in more specific and economically-relevant domains.
Furthermore, as briefly discussed above, the "biases" identified experimentally may be interpreted
as the very properties of the underlying categorization processes. More systematic efforts in this
direction are indeed one of the grounds over which the "mental model" view can prove to yield a
rather general characterization of economic agency, alternative to the utility maximizing one and
rich of empirically testable implications.
In addition, both preferences and mental representations are socially nested, and this is true in
particular for consumption behavior. So, for example, categories and prototypes may be seen as
"focal" cognitive constructs which allow models of the world to be socially communicated and
shared. Attitudes and preferences may be the result of both imitation and affective responses to such
common  "norms". Therefore, even though the issue has not been addressed here, we are fully aware
that a truly behavioral theory of consumption should not neglect the social dimension of
consumption acts.
To conclude, we obviously agree with Rabin (1998) in that not all aspects of human nature are
relevant to economics, nor they should be. The key scientific issue is deciding what is relevant and
what is not. In particular, if one chooses to abandon the traditional, "deductive" approach to
modeling behavior (which, it appears, leads us to be "precisely wrong"), and chooses instead to go
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out in the field and (much less precisely) infer empirical regularities from what one observes, then
the Pandora box is open.
However, a truly psychological foundation of consumption theory, we have argued, VKRXOG be a goal
worth pursuing by economists, even if this may imply leaving aside the handy, neoclassical toolkit
to which many of us are used. One useful starting point may be to take psychology more seriously in
what has to offer in terms of  "positive", alternative accounts of human behavior, rather than only in
terms of the critiques it moves to rational models. As Kahneman et al. (1998) put it:
"The alternative to rational choice as a descriptive model is neither chaos nor an endless list of ad hoc claims. It is a
manageable set of concepts and testable propositions, which often predict surprising parallels between ostensibly
different behaviors in different domains". Kahneman et al. ((1998), p. 32).
Within this broad program, the search for the cognitive roots of consumption acts, and of their
socially shaped evolution, promises to yield novel foundations to consumption theory, much more
in tune with experimental evidence, and, hopefully, parsimonious enough to be of use even to
economists.
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VII. Appendix: a brief guide to references
The following is a concise list of the topics discussed in the text plus some additional ones with the related references. It
is by no means intended as a complete bibliography on the issues cited, but only as a selected guide out of a much wider
literature. Several of the books and articles cited may present overlappings with other topics, some of which have not
been mentioned in the survey. The order roughly corresponds to the order in which topics have been discussed in the
text.
$WWUDFWLRQHIIHFW: Aaker, (1991), Burton and Zinkhan, (1987), Heath and Chatterjee, (1991), Heath
and Chatterjee, (1995),  Huber et al., (1982), Huber and Puto, (1983), Kardes et al., (1989), Mishra
et al., (1993), Ratneshwar et al., (1987), Simonson, (1989), Stewart, (1989).
'LUHFWLRQ RI FRPSDULVRQ HIIHFW: Dhar and Simonson, (1992), Houston et al., (1989), Johar and
Creyer, (1993).
7UDGHRII&RQWUDVW: Simonson and Tversky, (1992).
([WUHPHQHVV $YHUVLRQ &RPSURPLVH (IIHFW: Simonson, (1989), Simonson and Tversky, (1992),
Wernerfelt, (1995).
$GYDQWDJHPRGHO: Shafir et al., (1989), Shafir et al., (1990), Tversky and Simonson, (1993).
)UDPLQJ: Kahneman et al., (1982), Levin and Gaeth, (1988), Tversky and Kahneman, (1981),
Tversky and Kahneman, (1986).
3UHIHUHQFHUHYHUVDOV: Slovic and Lichtenstein, (1968), Tversky and Thaler, (1990).
,QWUDQVLWLYLW\RISUHIHUHQFHV: Tversky, (1969).
+HXULVWLFV: Bettman et al., (1991), Bettman et al., (forthcoming), Payne, (1976), Payne, (1990),
7KH(OLPLQDWLRQ%\$VSHFWVPRGHO: Tversky, (1972).
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3UHIHUHQFH7UHHDQG+LHUDUFKLFDO(OLPLQDWLRQPRGHO: Tversky and Sattath, (1979)
$JHQGDVDQGFRQVWUDLQHGFKRLFH: Hauser, (1986), Kahn et al., (1987), Tversky and Sattath, (1979).
6LPLODULW\: Tversky, (1977), Tversky and Gati, (1978), Johnson, (1986). Johnson et al., (1992).
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